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Articles

I

Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with
Positional Conflicts: A "Foolish
Consistency"?
Helen A. Anderson©1
2
"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds."

"But it was my view that lawyers don't stand in the shoes of their
clients3and that good lawyers can give advice and argue any side of a
case."
Anyone who has observed a law school moot court competition
knows that a lawyer can argue both sides of an issue, and sometimes
1. Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. B.A. Carleton
College, J.D. University of Washington. The author wishes to thank Professor Louis
Wolcher, who provided extremely useful comments on an earlier draft, and Professor
Jacqueline McMurtrie for her insights about positional conflicts in criminal defense.
Many other colleagues at the University of Washington provided valuable comments at a
faculty colloquium I presented in October 2005. I am also grateful for the excellent
assistance of my research assistant, Amy Orgain.
2.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITs 70 (P F

Collier & Son 1909).
3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States, 1 0 9 th Cong. 158 (Sept. 13, 2005) (Roberts discussed his pro
bono work).
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extremely well. In a moot court competition, teams of law students
proceed through the contest arguing first one side of a case, then the
other. Often these contradictory arguments are within hours of each
other. The contestants suffer no loss of credibility for their sideswitching.
In the practice of law, of course, conflict of interest rules prevent
lawyers from being on both sides of the same case. But should lawyers
be allowed to take contradictory legal positions in unrelated cases?
Although there is concern about such "positional conflicts" today, in
1872 the answer was yes. Lawyer and Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter
argued contradictory interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges and immunities clause to the Supreme Court in two famous
cases. Carpenter represented a woman denied admission to the bar in
Bradwell v. Illinois4 and in the Slaughter-House Cases5 he defended the
state of Louisiana's grant of a butchering monopoly.
In Bradwell, Carpenter argued that the privileges and immunities
clause protected his client's right to pursue an avocation in law. But in
the Slaughter-House Cases, he argued that the clause did not impair the
state's authority to regulate and restrict the "butchering industry."6 The
4. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 136 (1873).
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 48 (1873).
6. Senator Carpenter argued first in the Bradwell case that the "privileges and
immunities" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (then only 5 years old) included the
right to pursue all avocations. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39. While he conceded the state
had the authority to prescribe qualifications for a profession, he argued that it could not
exclude an entire class of citizens from any avocation. Id. at 137, 21 L.Ed. 442, 444.
(The Lawyer's Edition reporter of the Supreme Court decisions includes the arguments of
counsel). "I maintain that the fourteenth amendment opens to every citizen of the United
States, male or female, black or white, married or single, the honorable professions as
well as the servile employments of life; and that no citizen can be excluded from any one
of them." Id.
Yet, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, only two weeks later, he argued that the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not impair the authority of
Louisiana to grant one company the exclusive right to sell and butcher animals for food
in a certain area. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 66. Carpenter argued, "The
privileges and immunities here contemplated are those which are fundamental, as, for
instance the right of going into any state for the purpose of residing therein; the right of
taking up one's residence therein, and becoming a citizen; the right of free entrance and
exit, and passage through; the protection of the laws affecting personal liberty." 21 L.Ed.
394, 402.
The conflict seems clear. In maintaining in Bradwell that the privileges and
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included professions and avocations,
he undermined the argument that the state had the authority to exclude certain citizens
from the avocation of butchering. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39. In addition, Carpenter's
eagerness to show that the Court could decide for Bradwell without granting women the
right to vote ended up cutting against his argument in the Slaughter House Cases that the
privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment included only those that were
"fundamental" such as the right to travel. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 52. (Surely
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arguments were within weeks of each other. Carpenter prevailed in the
Slaughter-House Cases but lost in Bradwell. The Bradwell decision
relied almost exclusively on the precedent set in the Slaughter-House
Cases one day earlier.
Carpenter's contradictory legal positions before the same court were
not seen as an ethical problem at the time; in fact, the cases brought him
fame and a thriving Supreme Court practice. 8 Carpenter's actions were
consistent with the lawyerly ideals of independence, detachment and
Yet under the ethics rules in most American
professionalism.
jurisdictions today, Carpenter's dual representations would be seen as a
conflict of interest, and therefore, an ethical violation.
Since an ethical concern with legal positional conflicts was raised in
the 1983 comments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
legal authorities have analyzed positional conflicts as potential conflicts
of interest. According to most authorities today, a positional conflict is
not a per se ethical violation, but may become a conflict of interest if the
issue is important enough to the clients and there is a risk that one
representation will materially limit the other; for example, by leading to
precedent from one case that will adversely control the other (as was true
with Senator Carpenter's cases). 9
Positional conflicts are rarely the subject of litigation and there are
few published cases on the subject. It is the author's belief that lawyers
suppress most positional conflicts and that business conflicts are the
greater force. Business conflicts are not necessarily ethical code
violations, but the term used to describe economic pressures lawyers face
to favor one case over another. For example, where a client provides
repeat business, a lawyer would not want to offend that client by taking
on a case or making an argument of which that client disapproves.
The presence of a positional conflict is actually evidence that a
business conflict may have been overcome. It is when a lawyer decides
the right to vote is a fundamental privilege of citizenship). One can imagine ways to
reconcile the arguments in the two cases, but the need for such reconciliation is further
evidence of the conflict. At any rate, the conflict was made even clearer when Carpenter
won the Slaughterhouse Cases, but lost Bradwell, and when the decision in Bradwell
cited heavily his victory in the Slaughterhouse Cases.
Carpenter was paid for his representation in the Slaughter-House Cases, but took on
Myra Bradwell's case pro bono. See Jane M. Friedman, Myra Bradwell: On Defying the
Creator andBecoming a Lawyer, 28 VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REv. 1287, 1293-97 (1994).
7. Bradwell, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873).
8. See E. BRUCE THOMPSON, MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER: WEBSTER OF THE WEST
102-03 (Vail-Ballou Press, Inc. 1954). "His courage in the conduct of a cause was the
sublimity of heroism, and his fidelity to his clients was never open to suspicion."
MEMORIAL ADDRESSES ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF MATTHEW H. CARPENTER 70

(Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1882).
9. See section II, infra.
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not to make a contrary argument for one client in order to avoid
offending or harming another client that an ethical problem is likely to be
present. The real ethical concern should be the possibility that a lawyer's
interest in, loyalty to, or dependence on, a particular client may limit the
representation of other clients. Too much focus on a rule against
positional conflicts creates incentives for lawyers to avoid the positional
conflict by bowing to business conflicts and suppressing arguments for
or dropping the less favored client. There is some evidence that this is
exactly what has happened in many law practices, which may explain
why there are so few cases raising the question of positional conflicts.
Thus, an ethical
rule against positional conflicts seems
counterproductive.
Even for lawyers who practice without business conflicts, (e.g.,
public defenders or legal services lawyers), a rule against positional
conflicts does not help clients. An excessive concern with avoiding
positional conflicts in these kinds of cases could lead to unnecessary
withdrawal of quality counsel, which is generally scarce.10
At the same time, positional conflicts can raise serious attorney
credibility questions. Depending on the importance of the issue to both
cases, and the proximity of the arguments in time and place, the lawyer
presenting conflicting legal arguments may face credibility problems
with clients, the court(s) and the public.
Underlying this credibility concern is ambivalence in the profession
about lawyer sincerity. According to the traditional "cab rank" view of
law practice, a lawyer honorably takes the position of whatever client
jumps in his cab."
Under this view, a lawyer is an independent
professional who does not necessarily endorse the viewpoints or goals of
his or her clients, but nevertheless makes the best arguments possible for
them. It is this view of the profession that permeates the Model Rules
and most legal authorities. Allowing legal positional conflicts seems
perfectly consistent with the independent cab rank view of lawyering.
But even under this traditional "independent" view of the
profession, a positional conflict presents credibility problems, suggesting
10. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENSE, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE-A REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/

fullreport.pdf; ACLU

OF

WA

REPORT ON INDIGENT DEFENSE

(2004), available at

http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/indigentdefenserpt.pdf, Deborah Rhode, Essay: The Pro
Bono Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law Students, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1563
(2002).

11. See, e.g., Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee,
Guidance Opinion No. 89-27 at 2 (1990), available at http://www.phillybar.org/
public/ethics/displayethics.asp?id=8015282000.
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that lawyers and judges hold simultaneous contradictory ideas about the
lawyer's role. Under the traditional view, advocates usually choose their
positions not because they believe in them but because these positions
best serve their clients. We also know that many lawyers would
represent either side of a controversy and take the first client who
approaches them. Lawyers who do so suffer no loss in credibility. Why
then should their credibility be diminished if they argue a contrary
position in an unrelated case? This concern about credibility cannot be
simply reasoned away-there is something about the lawyer's
performance that demands at least a semblance of loyalty to the
argument. A lawyer who argues on both sides of an issue may have
difficulty establishing a persuasive character or ethos. Nevertheless,
eliminating an ethical rule against positional conflicts, and making clear
that a lawyer can argue both sides of a question ethically, will greatly
reduce these credibility problems.
This article argues that a legal positional conflict is not a true
conflict of interest, and should not be the subject of an ethical
prohibition. Because of the incentives it creates, a rule against positional
conflicts gives greater control to wealthy clients over the availability of
legal services without significantly protecting the rights of poor or
middle income clients. Business conflicts already exert significant
pressure on lawyers; too much concern with potential positional conflicts
only increases that pressure.
This article also argues that eliminating an ethical prohibition
against positional conflicts could mitigate much of the credibility
concerns raised by contradictory legal arguments. But even if the
profession fully endorsed the ethic of independence and eliminated a rule
against positional conflicts, some credibility problems would inevitably
remain. Thus, while there should be no rule against positional conflicts,
a court should respect an appointed attorney's decision to withdraw
because of credibility concerns.
Part I of this article defines a legal positional conflict, and
distinguishes between legal and factual positional conflicts. Part II
surveys the historical evolution of the ABA position on positional
conflicts while Part III describes the approaches of the Restatement on
the Law of Lawyering, case law, state ethics opinions and state ethical
codes. Part IV critiques the predominant analysis of positional conflicts
as potential conflicts of interest, arguing that it exacerbates business
conflicts and creates harmful incentives. This section also acknowledges
the credibility concerns with positional conflicts, and illustrates the
operation of a positional conflict with the example of a public defender.
Part V sets forth a proposal to amend the comments to Model Rule 1.7.
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What Is a Positional or Issue Conflict?

The American Bar Association defines the question of positional or
issue conflicts as "whether a lawyer can represent a client with respect to
a substantive legal issue when the lawyer knows that the client's position
on that issue is directly contrary to the position being urged by the
lawyer (or the lawyer's firm) on behalf of another client in a different,
and unrelated pending matter., 12 A seminal article on the topic states:
"A positional conflict of interest occurs when a law firm adopts a legal
position for one client seeking a particular legal result that is directly
contrary to the position taken on behalf of another present or former
client, seeking
an opposite legal result, in a completely unrelated
13
matter."
In a positional conflict, because the matters and parties are
unrelated, there would be no conflict of interest but for the contrary
arguments the lawyer asserts.1 4 A positional conflict will rise to the level
of a conflict of interest if it creates a "significant risk that the
representation of [a] client will be materially limited" by the lawyer's
opposing arguments in an unrelated matter.1 5 If there is a conflict of
interest, then the attorney and the attorney's firm may not represent both
clients, unless both clients give reasonable, informed consent.' 6 If an
attorney with a conflict of interest continues with both representations
absent such consent, he or she may be subject to a disqualification
motion and/or disciplinary proceedings.17 A conflict of interest may also
support a malpractice action by showing a breach of the standard of
care.1 8 Thus, whether a positional conflict constitutes a conflict of
interest under the ethical rules is a critical question.

12. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 at 1
(1993).
13.

John S. Dzienkowski, PositionalConflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REv. 457, 460

(1993).
14. Rule 1.7(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: "(1) the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2005).

Subsection (1) does not apply to a

positional conflict because it refers to situations where the attorney is proceeding directly
against one client on behalf of another client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7

cmt. 6 (2004).
15.
16.
17.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2005).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2005).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (2005); RONALD D. ROTUNDA

& JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS-THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY § 1.10-7 (West Group 2005).
18.

ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, § 1-9(c)(3).
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Sometimes lawyers and others use the term "positional conflict" to
describe what is really a business conflict 9 that will never ripen into a
positional conflict. For example, in one survey, lawyers in different
firms repeatedly used the term to refer to a problem in accepting clients
or cases that more valuable clients would object to, regardless of whether
such representation would entail making arguments that actually conflict
with arguments made on behalf of these valuable clients. 20 In a case that
made the front page of the New York Times, a large law firm withdrew
from pro bono representation of New York City against gun
manufacturers because of, in the words of a firm statement, "certain
potential 'positional conflicts' involving the position of long-term
existing clients and those being advanced in the gun case., 21 Legal
experts commented, however, that the firm's decision was based upon
economic, not ethical, pressures. 22 The firm was not actually faced with
taking contrary positions, just the disapproval of powerful clients.2 3
Use of the term "positional conflict" to cover business conflicts is
confusing, and actually lumps together situations where lawyers argue
conflicting positions on behalf of different clients, and situations where
lawyers refuse to make the conflicting arguments or suppress the
problem for economic reasons. When the term "positional conflict" is
used in this article, it refers to the former situation. Of course, a true
positional conflict may exist together with-or cause-a business
conflict, but it may also occur without any significant conflicting
19. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 61-62
(1988) (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1981)). A business
conflict does not usually rise to the level of an ethical violation. Business conflicts have
been defined as "not a properly disqualifying conflict of interest, but merely the risk of
loss of business from having a firm member be perceived to adopt a policy position that
one of the firm's clients might not like." Id. Gordon adds, "What is especially
interesting about such prohibitions is not so much that partners impose them, but that the
partners are so unembarrassed about doing so, even though the practice violates-in
addition to the formal provisions of some codes of ethics--every conceivable traditional
ideal of independence their profession has ever entertained." Id.
20. Susan P. Shapiro, Everests of the Mundane: Conflict of Interest in Real-World
Legal Practice,69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166-1168 (2000).
21. Top Law Firm Withdraws from City's Gun Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2004 at
Al, A17.
22. Id. The firm may have wished to make its withdrawal look motivated by ethical
rather than business considerations.
23. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Conflict Gives Bork a Starr Turn: Kirkland & Ellis
forced to give up role in Festo, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at 6. Another firm in a
high-profile case used the term "positional conflict" to describe a situation where one
client asked the firm to withdraw from a case in which it was appealing to the Supreme
Court an appellate decision that was favorable precedent for the client in another case in
which the firm was not involved. Id. This situation is more accurately labeled a business
conflict, since the firm was not making conflicting legal arguments, only one argument
that another client did not like.
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economic pressure on the attorney.
A positional conflict may be legal or factual.24 That is, a lawyer
may take contradictory positions with respect to an issue of fact or an
issue of law. Examples of legal positional conflicts are: arguing for one
client that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional, while25
arguing for another client that the Guidelines are unconstitutional;
arguing that jury recommendations in a capital case are entitled to great
weight in one case, and arguing in another case that such
recommendations are not entitled to great weight.2 6 An example of a
factual positional conflict is arguing in one case that the United States
uranium market is competitive, while arguing in another that it is not.27
This article is concerned primarily with legal, rather than factual,
positional conflicts because a factual positional conflict is more likely to
meet the definition of a conflict of interest even without a special rule
against positional conflicts. A factual overlap in two cases is more likely
to require the lawyer to attack and defend the same evidence and
witnesses, and is also likely to present the danger of misusing
confidential information. 28 To the extent a factual conflict does not
create a clear conflict of interest because of the factual overlap, it may
raise the same ethical issues as a pure legal positional conflict. It is
difficult to separate fact from law, and legal arguments are tightly
entwined with and dependent upon characterizations of the facts.28
The classic example of a factual positional conflict is Fiandaca v.
Cunningham,29 where New Hampshire Legal Assistance represented two
class clients: mentally retarded citizens and women prisoners. When the
state offered to settle the prisoner litigation by offering a facility already
being used for the mentally retarded, the previously unrelated lawsuits
became related and the NHLA found itself unable to advocate two
different uses of the same facility. Had the lawyers agreed to the
24. See, e.g., Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. OF App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005). Of course, the line between fact and law is notoriously
difficult to draw at times. Id.
25. See Fed. Defenders of San Diego Inc. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n,
infra note 89.
26. See Williams v. State, infra note 89.
27. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., infra note 98. The court
did not find a factual positional conflict, but ruled on other grounds.
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b), 3.3, 3.4 (2005). By a factual
conflict I mean a conflict about what the facts are (e.g., what happened, who is telling the
truth), rather than a conflict about the significance or characterization of similar facts
(e.g., whether a shoe is a deadly weapon).
28. Louis E. Wolcher, Pavcnik's Theory of Legal Decisionmaking:An Introduction,
72 WASH. L. REV. 469, 472-73 (1997).
29. Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987), discussed in ROTUNDA &
DzIENKOWSKI, supra, note 17, at § 1.7-6(o)(6).
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settlement offer, the settlement would have had a direct and immediate
impact upon their other class clients. And, as with any factual conflict,
there would be the danger of misusing a client's30 confidential
information, another basis for finding a conflict of interest.
A positional conflict of interest can arise in litigation, transactional
work, lobbying, or some combination thereof.3' The litigation context is
the paradigm example, because there the lawyer is asserting two contrary
legal arguments as correct. The lobbying context presents similar
concerns where the lawyer asserts conflicting positions about what the
law should be. In a transactional context, the lawyer may be advising
clients to take a position or course of action as a tactical matter and can
explain the risks-thus, where both matters are transactional there is
little real conflict. But where one matter is transactional and the other
involves litigation, a serious positional conflict can develop. In the
litigation matter the lawyer may advocate a position that undercuts the
position the lawyer helped the transactional client take.33 The present
analysis focuses primarily on positional conflicts in a litigation context
because it is the "paradigm example" and brings into focus the debates
about lawyer sincerity and loyalty.
The most troublesome aspect of defining positional conflicts is
determining when arguments conflict. Not every contrary legal position
constitutes a positional conflict: some are innocuous. "[L]awyers take
contrary legal positions all the time. They sometimes take conflicting
legal positions in the same case." 34 For example, a lawyer may argue in
one case that legislative intent is a proper source of statutory
interpretation even where the text is clear, but in another case urge the
court not to look beyond the plain text of the statute despite clear
evidence of a different statutory intent. Such a "conflict" would not
strike most lawyers as noteworthy; in fact a lawyer who stubbornly stuck
to one view of statutory interpretation in every representation, no matter
what the result for the client, would probably be viewed as inept.
Whether conflicting arguments rise to the level of a positional conflict

30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2005); see also Westinghouse,
infra note 98, where the firm's conflicting positions on the competitiveness of the
uranium industry created a factual positional conflict and the danger of misusing
confidential information.
31. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 464. Dzienkowski first identified these three
categories of conflicts, but used the litigation positional conflict as the "model for
analyzing all positional conflicts of interest." Id.
32. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 467.
33. See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 468 (discussing conflict of interest involving
the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom).
34. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, at § 1.7-6(o)(4).
36. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 509.
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will depend at least in part on how important the issues are to each
representation.36 Some argue that positional conflicts can only arise with
substantive, as opposed to procedural, legal arguments; 35 although the
line between substance and procedure is tricky to draw, and some
"procedural" issues can be of great significance to the clients. 6 The
difficulty in distinguishing between innocuous and significant positional
conflicts is one argument against requiring lawyers to avoid them.3 7
Most authorities say that a conflict with a position taken on behalf
of a former client raises no ethical concerns-that a positional conflict
can only arise between concurrent clients.38 If the former representation
has concluded, then, especially in the litigation context, the lawyer's
subsequent representation can do no harm to the former client's case.
Provided that the former and current representations do not run afoul of
other ethical prohibitions, a lawyer is free to change positions or clients
over time.39 Were this not the case, lawyers would have difficulty
changing their practice and, for example, moving from defense work to
plaintiff's work in a particular area.
The prevalence of positional conflicts is difficult to gauge. Some
sources suggest that lawyers commonly practice with positional
conflicts; that arguing different sides of the same legal issue is part of
everyday lawyering. Ethics opinions from California and Philadelphia
state that positional conflicts are common.4 ° One commentator seems to
35. See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 484, n. 219-220; ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377, n.1 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 8-12, as amended 312 U.S. 655 (1941)
(discussing whether plaintiff could be found in contempt for refusing to submit to a
physical examination was a matter of procedure).
37. See Part III(C), infra.
38. See discussion of ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-377 (1993), infra. But see Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 496-498.
39. Dzienkowksi, supra note 13, at 496. Dzienkowski notes that an exception might
arise where the former client is a repeat player whom the lawyer expects to represent
again. Id. In such a situation, the former client might be considered more of a continuing
client than a former client. Id. Dzienkowski also notes that a lawyer switching sides on
an issue might have credibility problems with the court. Id. at 497. In addition,
transactional lawyers who develop contractual provisions for clients should not be able to
attack those provisions later even in unrelated cases. Id. at 530-531. But he concludes
that limitations on successive positional conflicts should be limited: "To give former
clients a right to prevent lawyers from taking different positions in the future would give
the past too much of a claim on the future." Id. at 498.
40. See California Ethics Opinion No. 1989-108, available at http://calbar.ca.gov/
calbar/html-unclassified/ca89-108.html; Philadelphia Ethics Opinion 89-27, supra note
11. The California Committee stated that positional conflicts are "common and prolific
in our adversarial system of justice." California Ethics Opinion No. 1989-108 at 3. The
Philadelphia opinion states that "[p]ractices throughout the country all have lawyers who
go into court on one day and argue an interpretation of the law for custody for a mother
and the next day go into a different court in a different case and argue a different
interpretation for a father. This is the essence of what a lawyer does." Philadelphia
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accept that "[i]t is the job of the lawyer to argue in one way for client A
on Monday and in the opposite way for client B on Tuesday. 41 An
article in a family law journal states that divorce lawyers commonly
represent both husbands and wives, as well as other family members or
interested parties so that "it is common for divorce lawyers to represent
clients with antagonistic legal, as distinguished from factual, positions. 42
Arguments against requiring firms to screen for positional conflicts often
assume that such conflicts are numerous, if mostly insignificant.
Yet other sources suggest that while lawyers often feel the pressure
of potential positional conflicts, they frequently resolve the problem by
refusing the second representation-in other words, the positional
conflict never materializes.43 In an age of increasing competition and
specialization, many lawyers have. abandoned the cab rank view and
instead practice on one side of an area, thereby avoiding many significant
positional conflicts and keeping their clients happy. Certainly, there is
very little litigation over positional conflicts.
It may be that these seemingly contradictory observations about the
prevalence of positional conflicts can be reconciled by distinguishing
between minor positional conflicts over less important legal issues (of
which there are many) and major positional conflicts over issues of great
significance to the parties (of which there are few). It may also be that
lawyer independence and the prevalence of positional conflicts varies
with practice types and legal communities.
II.

Historical Context and the Evolution of the ABA Position on
Positional Conflicts

Although lawyers' conflicts of interest have been the subject of
regulation since medieval times, 44 there is little, if any, discussion of
Ethics Opinion 89-27 at 2. A Maine opinion, on the other hand, says positional conflicts
are rare (perhaps meaning consequential conflicts). Maine Ethics Opinion No. 155
(1997) at 4.
41. J.M. Balkin, IdeologicalDrift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
869, 887 (1993).
42. David Walther and Anne Kass, Positional Conflict: Considering a One-SideRepresentationRule, 13 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 137 (1999).
43. Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophetand the Bureaucrat:PositionalConflicts in
Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (1998); Shapiro, supra note 20, at
1166. These sources contain interviews with lawyers indicating that fear of alienating
important clients causes them to reject cases that would require arguing against these
clients' institutional interests. For example, during one of Shapiro's interviews, the
managing partner of a large Philadelphia law firm observed, "My theory is that, of every
three phone calls I get, I get to take one on as a client. I've always said that somebody
could have a law firm about the size of [this firm] just taking on our conflicted
representations." Shapiro, supra note 20, at n. 16.
44. As early as 1280, a London Ordinance forbade attorneys from representing
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positional conflicts of interest before the adoption of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. Neither the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics nor the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility mentioned the issue, except arguably in the general
prohibitions of conflicts of interest, 45 and in the pro bono context by
allowing lawyers to advocate law reform contrary to the interest or
desires of a client.46
One commentator has suggested that broad
language in Canon 641 of the 1908 Canons caused positional conflicts to
be "given an overly zealous application, ' 48 but there is little evidence of
that zeal in the case law or other written record. 49 According to
Professor Hazard, "the traditional concept of the advocate's role did not
recognize positional conflicts as worthy of serious concern. 5 ° This
traditional concept included a "fierce insistence" on a lawyer's
independence and the "so-called cab rank rule.'
Senator Carpenter's
dual representation in the 1872 Supreme Court supports Hazard's
conclusion.52 The English bar, always more committed to the cab rank
rule than American lawyers, had historical examples of lawyers arguing
whatever position was assigned them-including trial lawyers who
adverse parties in the same action and from dropping one client to represent another in
the same case. Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the
Medieval and Early Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 146147 (2000).
45. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 469.
46. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1980). See ROTUNDA &
DzIENKOWSKl , supra note 17, at § 1.7-6(o)(2). The law reform provision addresses
positions a lawyer might take not in his capacity as a legal representative, and does not
focus on situations where the lawyer takes contrary legal positions for different clients.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.3, 6.4 (2005) (allowing lawyers to serve

as directors, officers or members of law reform organizations without creating a lawyerclient relationship); Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 531-536 (discussing positional
conflicts in the context of a lawyer's personal law reform activities).
47.

ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 6 (1908).

Canon 6 defined a

conflict to include "when, in behalf of one client, it is [the lawyer's] duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.3 (West Publishing Co. 1986).
48. WOLFRAM, supra note 49. Professor Dzienkowski notes that this assertion was
not supported by specific examples other than the case of Estates Theatres, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Dzienkowski,
supra note 13, at 469 n.47.
49. Dzienkowski notes a 1981 Legal Ethics Forum in which the participants
discussed what appeared to be a hypothetical positional conflict (without naming it as
such), but notes the participants seemed most concerned about the positional conflict
developing into a standard conflict of interest if the two clients ended up on opposite
sides of a lawsuit. Dzienkowski, supra note 13 at 470 n.49 (discussing Legal Ethics
Forum, 67 A.B.A. J. 1692 (1981)).
50.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W.

WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 10.10 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005).
51. Id.
52. See supra note 6.

2006]

LEGAL DOUBLETALK

53
traveled with judges and took sides as needed.
Before the ABA's first express statement on positional conflicts in
1983, the American legal profession underwent significant changes. The
end of the nineteenth century was a time of increasing professionalism54
for lawyers, as legal education evolved under Christopher Langdell.
Newly formed bar associations created barriers to entry through
educational and bar examination requirements. 55
The lawyer-topopulation ratio remained relatively stable until the 1970's, when law
schools "nearly doubled their enrollments.' '56 During the first half of the
century, the overwhelming
majority of lawyers was in private practice,
57
and most practiced solo.
Beginning in the 70's, the barriers to entry ceased to keep down the
number of new lawyers. Between 1951 and 1995, the number of lawyers
increased more than fourfold. 58 Between 1970 and 1991, the lawyer-topopulation ration went from 1:572 to 1:313.59 The number and
percentage of lawyers working for the government increased
significantly, and the percentage of solo practitioners went from 61.2 in
1948 to 33.2 in 1988.60 More and more lawyers became employees
rather than independent professionals. 6' The increase in lawyers was
accompanied by an increase in competition and specialization. At the
same time, lawyers began practicing in ever-larger groups, as the number
ti these
hs large firms, lawyers
and size of large private firms grew. 62 Within

53. See Shaffer, infra note 204, at 150 n. 14 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, A Historical
Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1071 (1978)).
Shaffer argues that American lawyers were always more identified with their clients than
English lawyers, who maintained more independence-and that an ethic of independence
(or separation from client) grew up later. Id.
54. Philip Gaines, The "True Lawyer" in America: Discursive Construction of the
Legal Profession in the Nineteenth Century, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 132, 133, 152-153
(2001).

55. Richard L. Abel, The Transformationof the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 7, 9 (1986).
56.

ROBERT W. GORDON, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S

CENTURY 292 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, and Robert A. Kagan, eds., 2002); Abel, supra
note 57, at 9.
57.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 461-62

(Yale University Press 2002).
58. Id. at 457.
59. John P. Heinz, Edward 0. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, & Ethan Michelson, The
Changing Characterof Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 751, 771 (1998).
60. GORDON, supra note 58, at 293.
61. Abel, supra note 57, at 16.
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 462. In the late 50's, there were only 38 firms with
more than 50 lawyers. In 1995 there were 702 firms, and the largest, Baker & McKenzie,
had 1,754 lawyers. Id.
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became increasingly segregated by area of substantive expertise. 63 Thus,
the typical lawyer's employment changed from a solo, general practice to
employment by a large institution, government agency, or firm. The
typical lawyer was no longer a general practitioner, but likely to be a
specialist on one side of a class of cases. A rule against positional
conflicts is consistent with such specialization.
Along with the enormous growth and specialization of the legal
profession that occurred between Senator Carpenter's time and the 1983
Model Code, there was a significant shift in the profession's
understanding of the law and how it worked. An early Nineteenth
Century belief in natural law gave way to a classical view of law as the
objective application of known principles.6 4 Thus, judges were viewed
as constrained by rules, rules that could be determined correctly through
reason. 65 This objective conception of law gave way in the early
twentieth century to legal realism. 66 The legal realists, whose influence

persists, attacked legal objectivity and formalism as a facade. 67 They
argued that "rules are malleable" and that law is never neutral but
inextricably bound up with politics.

68

This realist view gradually gained

hold with the bar at large, and today, its central tenets are considered
unremarkable. 69 The change in the predominant view of the working of
the law is 0 also consistent with a change in the attitude toward positional
7
conflicts.

63. John P. Heinz, Edward 0. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, & Ethan Michelson, The
Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 751, 759-60 (1998).
This article compares characteristics of law practice in
Chicago based on surveys in 1975 and 1995. The 1975 study showed a bar divided by
prestige between corporate lawyers and those who served individuals. In 1995 the
division was more complicated due to increased specialization and competition. Id.
64. ELIZABETH MENSCH, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 19-26 (David Kairys ed.,1982). As Mensch explains,

these predominant views were complicated and always evolving.
65. Id. at 24.
66. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 489-93.
67. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 490-93.
68. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 490-93; MENSCH, supra note 66, at 26-29.
69. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 493.
70. Under the earlier view of the law as objective, a lawyer's role in the creation of
law would be considered minimal, and a purely legal positional conflict would not be
thought likely to affect the outcome of either case. After the legal realist view had
pervaded the bar, with a sense of the indeterminacy of law and outcomes, it makes sense
that the lawyer's role in the creation of law would be seen as greater. Strategic choices
about arguments are seen as critical when there is no objectively correct outcome to be
found through the exercise of judicial reason. Lawyers and judges together create the
law. Under this view, a lawyer arguing two sides of a legal question has the potential to
do more harm to one of her clients, than would a lawyer who, under the earlier view, is
simply helping the court uncover the objectively correct outcome. See SPAULDING, supra
note 45, at 1400 (citing GEOFFREY HAZARD, Ethics in the Practiceof Law, in THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (Foundation Press, Inc., 3d ed. 1994).
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Against this backdrop of growth, specialization, competition, and
philosophical change, the ABA promulgated the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. These rules included Model Rule 1.7, which
addressed current conflicts of interest. The rule stated that a lawyer shall
not represent a client "if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client" or "if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests," unless the lawyer
reasonably believed that the representation would not be affected and the
client consented after consultation. 71 The rule itself did not mention
positional conflicts, but the comments to Model Rule 1.7 included a short
discussion that seemed to allow positional conflicts except under certain
circumstances:
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a
legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation
of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not
improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial
courts, but it may be improper
to do so in cases pending at the same
72
time in an appellate court.
Comment 9 did not set down a rigid rule, but introduced the idea of
positional conflict as an ethical issue. The comment was criticized for
recognizing a positional conflict only before an appellate court when trial
court decisions could also be influential with other judges.73 It was also
criticized for using the term "adversely affected" rather than the "directly
adverse" or "materially limited" language of the rule: "This ambiguity
essentially allows lawyers to decide for themselves when a litigational
positional conflict requires the independent determination of the effect
on the client and the clients' consent after disclosure. 7 4 Another
criticism was that the comment said nothing about notice and disclosure
of positional conflicts to clients.7 5 Thus, the criticisms urged a stronger
rule against positional conflicts.
A 1993 ABA Ethics opinion departed from the Model Rule
comment in analyzing positional conflicts of interest. The authors of that
opinion rejected the comment's distinction between appellate and trial
71.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).

The rule was rewritten in

2002, but the "directly adverse" and "materially limited" language remains, as do the
concepts of informed but objectively reasonable consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2005).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7, cmt. para. 9 (1983).
73. WOLFRAM, supra note 49, at 355 n.41; Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides:
Issue or Positional Conflicts ofInterest, 51 FLA. L. REv. 383, 390 (1999).
74. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 473.
75. Id. at 473-74.
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courts, noting:
[E]ven if both cases were in the trial court, but assigned to different
judges, the decision in the first-decided case would, in all likelihood,
carry at least some precedential or persuasive weight in the second
case. And if both cases should happen to end up before the same
judge, the situation would be even worse. For although judges well
understand that lawyers, at various stages of their careers, can find
themselves arguing different sides of the same issue, the
persuasiveness and credibility of the lawyer's arguments in at least
one of the two pending matters would quite possibly76be lessened,
consciously or subconsciously, in the mind of the judge.
The opinion advised that the lawyer should not represent both clients
without their consent after full disclosure if there was a "substantial risk"
that one representation would create a legal precedent, which would be
"likely materially to undercut the legal position urged on behalf of the
other client. 7 7
Where the two matters would not be litigated in the same
jurisdiction, the opinion suggested the following considerations in
deciding whether representation of either client would be materially
78
limited:
(a) Is the issue one of such importance that its determination is
likely to affect the ultimate outcome of at least one of the
cases?
(b) Is the determination of the issue in one case likely to have a
significant impact on the determination of that issue in the
other case? (For example, does the issue involve a new or
evolving area of the law, where the first case decided may be
regarded as persuasive authority by other courts, regardless of
their geographical location? Or: is the issue one of federal
law, where the decision by one federal judge will be given
respectful consideration by another federal judge, even though
they are not in the same district or state?)
(c) Will there be any inclination by the lawyer, or her firm, to
"soft-pedal" or de-emphasize certain arguments or issueswhich otherwise would be vigorously pursued-so as to avoid
76.
77.

ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993).
Id.

78. Id. at n.4. The Committee concluded that the "materially limited" language of
then Model Rule 1.7 (b), rather than the "directly adverse" language of then Model Rule
1.7(a) applied, since in a positional conflict the attorney's clients are not involved in the
same litigation and are not therefore ever directly adverse to one another.
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impacting the other case?
(d) Will there be any inclination within the firm to alter any
arguments for one, or both clients, so that the firm's position in
the two cases can be reconciled-and,79if so, could that redound
to the detriment of one of the clients?
The Committee limited its analysis to positional conflicts between
current clients, noting that lawyers were free to change positions from
those advanced
for former clients and that such changes raised no ethical
80
issues.
In response to criticism, and in light of the 1993 Opinion, the
comment to Rule 1.7 was amended in 2002 as part of the large-scale
amendments to the model rules. (The text of the rule was also
amended). 81 The new comment 24 on positional conflicts states:
Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in
different tribunals at different times on behalf of different
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on
behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated
matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a
lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a
different case; for example, when a decision favoring one
client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the
position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk
include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between
the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and
long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients'
reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is
79. Id. The pressure to reconcile arguments so that the positional conflict never
materializes is an important concern. But including this factor in the analysis of a
positional conflict does not seem all that helpful if the real problem is that this pressure
results in the suppression of a positional conflict. If there is no positional conflict, there
will be no need to look at the factors. Instead, lawyers should think about this factor
whenever they consider related issues in otherwise unrelated cases. See infra section IV
(A).
80. Id. at 1. See Richmond, supra note 75, at 397, and HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 52 (concluding that lawyers should be free to advance positions contrary to those
they advanced for former clients). But see Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 480, and n. 11
(expressing some reservations about allowing positional conflicts in subsequent
representation).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2005). See supra note 73.
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significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed
consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one
82 of
the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
Thus, the official statements of the ABA, in the form of its 1993 opinion
and the comments to the Model Rules, indicate that a positional conflict
is not per se an ethical violation, but that an attorney should look
carefully at the attendant circumstances to determine whether a
significant risk of material limitation of either representation exists.
According to the ABA, a material limitation may result where the issue
is sufficiently important to the clients and victory in one case will create
adverse precedent for the other. While the 1993 opinion mentions
credibility concerns, these are not the focus of the suggested analytical
framework either in the opinion or the rule comments.
III.

Other Legal Authorities on Positional Conflicts

A.

The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers

The approach of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers to positional conflicts is very similar to the new comment 24 to
Model Rule 1.7.83 The comment to the Restatement suggests the same
factors for determining whether a positional conflict creates a conflict of
interest and begins with the presumption that taking inconsistent
positions in different courts is acceptable.84 The Restatement factors for
evaluating a positional conflict focus on the significance of the legal
issue and the risk of creating adverse precedent for one of the clients.
The illustrations emphasize the distinction between appellate and trial
82.
83.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. para. 24 (2005).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7, cmt. para. 24 (2005).

84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 128, cmt. f. (2000).
The official comment to section 128 provides:
A lawyer ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different courts at
different times. While each client is entitled to the lawyer's effective advocacy
of that client's position, if the rule were otherwise law firms would have to
specialize in a single side of legal issues.
However, a conflict is presented when there is a substantial risk that a lawyer's
action in Case A will materially and adversely affect another of the lawyer's
clients in Case B. Factors relevant in determining the risk of such an effect
include whether the issue is before a trial court or an appellate court; whether
the issue is substantive or procedural; the temporal relationship between the
matters; the practical significance of the issue to the immediate and long-run
interests of the clients involved; and the clients' reasonable expectations in
retaining the lawyer. If a conflict of interest exists, absent informed consent of
the affected clients under § 122, the lawyer must withdraw from one or both of
the matters.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 128, cmt. f. (2000).
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85
courts, as well as substance and procedure.

B.

Case Law Addressing PositionalConflicts

There is next to no case law on purely legal positional conflicts, in
striking contrast to the enormous number of decisions on conflicts of
interest in general.86 What case law exists provides little guidance. The
two cases that discuss purely legal positional conflicts are criminal cases
involving public defenders, and they reach very different conclusions.87
The cases usually cited by commentators on positional conflicts actually
present factual positional conflicts.
One such case frequently cited in writings on positional conflicts is
the 1972 Estates Theatres, Inc., v. Columbia Pictures Indus.88 In this
antitrust action, the lawyer for plaintiff Estates Theatres also represented
United Artists Theatre Circuit ("UATC") as a plaintiff in another
antitrust action. Although UATC was not a defendant in the first action,
in his role as counsel for Estates Theatres the lawyer had named UATC
as a co-conspirator in a letter, alleging that a theater owned by UATC
was receiving more favorable treatment than plaintiffs theatre. 89 The
defendant moved to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, arguing that "to
support its claim he would necessarily be required to offer evidence
that.., one of the theatres owned by UATC, was the beneficiary of
85. Id. illustrations 5, 6:
5. Lawyer represents two clients in damage actions pending in different United
States District Courts. In one case, representing the plaintiff, Lawyer will
attempt to introduce certain evidence at trial and argue there for its
admissibility. In the other case, representing a defendant, Lawyer will object to
an anticipated attempt by the plaintiff to introduce similar evidence. Even if
there is some possibility that one court's ruling might be published and cited as
authority in the other proceeding, Lawyer may proceed with both
representations without obtaining the consent of the clients involved.
6. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that the cases have proceeded to
the point where certiorari has been granted in each by the United States
Supreme Court to consider the common evidentiary question. Any position
that Lawyer would assert on behalf of either client on the legal issue common
to each case would have a material and adverse impact on the interests of the
other client. Thus, a conflict of interest is presented. Even the informed
consent of both Client A and Client B would be insufficient to permit Lawyer
to represent each before the Supreme Court.
86. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, at § 1.10-7(d) (discussing the
many trial court decisions on motions to disqualify, but noting the lack of appellate
cases).
87. See Williams v. State, 805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002) and Fed. Defenders of San
Diego., Inc., v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 690 F.Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1988), discussed at
infra notes 108-123 and accompanying text.
88. 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cited in Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 470;
WOLFRAM, supra note 49, at 355; Richmond, supra note, 75 at 398-99.
89. Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 96.
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unlawful conduct at the expense of plaintiff, his other client."9 ° The
defense also argued that Estates Theatres' efforts to unearth evidence of
UATC's unlawful conduct would help the government in its own
separate antitrust action against UATC. 91 Thus the case seems to present
a factual positional conflict because the plaintiff's attorney would be
forced to develop and argue facts that would damage his other client.
But it is perhaps the court's "sweeping language" 92 that has led to
its frequent citation:
A lawyer should not be permitted to put himself in a position where,
even unconsciously he will be tempted to "soft pedal" his zeal in
furthering the interests of one client in order to avoid an obvious
clash with those of another, at least in the absence of the express
consent of both clients.... The attorney cannot at one and the same
time be the prosecutor of the plaintiffs claim ...and the defender of
the target, UATC.... To allow such conflicting positions under the
facts here presented would impair the93confidence and respect of the
community towards its bench and bar.
Arguably, such language could be applied to legal positional conflicts as
well as factual conflicts.
The danger that a lawyer may modify
arguments to accommodate both representations exists in both a factual
and legal positional conflict.9 4
Two other factual positional conflict cases, Fiandaca v.
Cunningham95 and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,96
are also sometimes cited as examples of positional conflicts.9 7 In
Fiandaca, as discussed earlier, the New Hampshire Legal Assistance
represented two class action clients and was faced with a conflict when
the state offered to settle one class action by offering a facility then used
by the other class.98 NHLA responded to the settlement offer by stating
it was unwilling to agree to an offer that was "against the stated
interests" of its other clients, 99 clearly flagging its conflict of interest.

90.
91.

Id. at 97.

92.

Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 471.

93.

Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 99.

Id.

94. This is the lesson that Professors Rotunda and Dzienkowski suggest taking from
the factual positional conflict in Fiandaca. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI , supra note 17, at

§ 1.7-6(o)(6).
95. 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
96. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1978).
97. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, at § 1.7-6(o)(6); Richmond, supra
note 75, at 400-03.
98. Fiandaca, 827 F.2d at 827, discussed supra at p. 108.
99. Id.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NHLA should have been
disqualified because its representation of one class was materially limited
by its responsibilities to another, at least with respect to the settlement
offer.' 0 0 "In short, the combination of clients and circumstances placed
NHLA in the untenable position of being simultaneously obligated to
represent vigorously the interests of two conflicting clients."'' ° The
factual conflict in Fiandaca seems quite clear. While there may be
policy reasons to argue against disqualification-most notably the lack
of alternative counsel for an indigent class-it is difficult to argue that
NHLA's representation was not compromised by its conflicting loyalties
with respect to the facility that was the subject of the settlement offer. In
addition, as with any factual conflict, there was probably a risk that
confidential information from one client would be used against another
client.
The possible misuse of confidential information was a large part of
the court's rationale in disqualifying counsel in the Westinghouse case.
The law firm of Kirkland & Ellis represented plaintiff Westinghouse in
an antitrust case alleging an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade in the
uranium industry. 10 2 At the same time, Kirkland and Ellis represented
the American Petroleum Institute, of which three defendants in the
Westinghouse suit were members, and lobbied Congress on API's
behalf. 10 3 As part of that lobbying effort, Kirkland and Ellis took the
position that the uranium industry was competitive and not in need of
regulation. Thus its positions on the competitiveness of the uranium
industry conflicted. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered disqualification not so much because of these conflicting
positions, but because Kirkland and Ellis had entered into a fiduciary
relationship-if not a full-fledged attorney-client relationship-with the
individual members of API (including those who were defendants in the
Westinghouse litigation). 10 4 The law firm had solicited confidential
business information from those members and led them to believe it
would remain protected. 10 5 The Westinghouse case is thus more about a
100.

Id at 831. The Fiandacacase has generated considerable discussion about the

scarcity of legal services and disqualification motions. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, More
About Us: Another Take on the Abusive Use of Legal Ethics Rules, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 843, 845 (1998); Kathy E. Hinck, Note, Second Class Prisoners: New
Hampshire'sPlacement Policyfor Female Offenders, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CIuM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 225, 226-27 (1989).

101.

827F.2dat829.

102. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1313 (7th
Cir 1978).
103. Id. at 1314.
104. Id. at 1320-21.
105. Id. at 1321.
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lawyer's fiduciary duty than positional conflicts.
The first case to address a straightforward purely legal positional
conflict is Williams v. State.10 6 In that case, the attorney appointed to
represent a client on appeal from his conviction and death sentence for
murder moved to withdraw.10 7 The attorney asserted that his client had
an arguable issue for appeal that the trial court erred when it gave "great
weight" to the jury's non-unanimous recommendation of the death
penalty.10 8 However, the attorney had already filed a brief in another
case before the same court (the highest court of Delaware) arguing that
the trial court erred when it failed to give great weight to the jury's nonunanimous recommendation against the death penalty. 10 9 The attorney
argued that he had a conflict of interest because of the risk that he would
create unfavorable precedent for one client, that his credibility with the
court would be undermined, and that his clients would question his
loyalty to them.' 10 The State agreed that the attorney had a conflict of
interest. 11
The court permitted the attorney to withdraw, holding that "[i]t
would be a violation of the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct for
[the attorney] to advocate conflicting legal positions in two capital
'
murder appeals that are pending simultaneously in this Court."112
Delaware had adopted the Model Rules, including Rule 1.7 and the
earlier comment that emphasized the inappropriateness of a positional
conflict in an appellate court." 13 The court also alluded to the criminal
clients' constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel on
appeal. 1 4 However, because there was no opposition to the motion to
withdraw, either from the state or the client, the decision does not test the
arguments for or against a positional conflict under these circumstances.
106.
107.

Williams v. State, 805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002).
Id.

108.
109.

Id. at 881.
Id.

110. The arguments in the two cases could be reconciled, of course, by arguing in
both cases that only a jury recommendation of leniency should be given great weight. By

the time the attorney received the second case, it may have been too late to tailor the
arguments in the first case. Moreover, to change the arguments in this way would have
been to allow one representation to limit the other. See infra Section IV.
111. Williams, 805 A.2d at 881.

112. Id. at 882.
113. Id.at881.
114. "Given his clients' disparate legal arguments, [the attorney's] independent
obligations to his clients may compromise the effectiveness of his assistance as appellate

counsel for one or both clients unless his motion to withdraw is granted." Id. at 882.
Interestingly, the attorney who was later appointed to represent Williams did not even
raise the jury recommendation issue, but obtained a reversal of the death penalty on
another ground. See Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002) (reversing death
sentence).
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Another criminal case discussed positional conflicts in an
adversarial setting, but with different results. In Federal Defenders of
San Diego, Inc. v. U.S. Sentencing Commission,"5 organizations of
federal public defenders brought suit challenging the constitutionality of
sentencing guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission. The case was dismissed for lack of standing." 16 As part of
their argument for standing, the plaintiffs had claimed injury in fact
based on positional conflicts that would be created by the sentencing
guidelines. The lawyers argued that because some of their clients would
be better off under the guidelines while the majority would be worse off,
a successful challenge to the guidelines on behalf of the majority would
injure the minority." 7 They noted that the ethical dilemma would be
"exacerbated" because a public defender would rarely know until well
into a case whether a particular client fell into the disadvantaged
group."18 The court rejected the argument, doubting the significance of
the number of conflicting cases.'19
The court also expressed doubt about whether a positional conflict
was an ethical problem. "In addition, with all due respect to [plaintiffs
expert], I am not at all convinced that the taking of inconsistent positions
in separate cases raises the sort of ethical dilemma that [the expert]
suggests."' 120
But the court recognized the discomfort individual
attorneys may feel and recommended that they
be allowed to recuse
121
themselves "when they consider it appropriate."'
The paucity of case law discussing legal positional conflicts does
not mean such conflicts do not arise. There is evidence both for and
against the prevalence of positional conflicts in practice. 122 The lack of
case law may be explained by, among other reasons: (1) scarcity of
positional conflicts; (2) the ability of lawyers to make conflicts go away
through careful tailoring or distinguishing of arguments; (3) such
conflicts are suppressed when an attorney bows to pressure from a
powerful client; (4) such conflicts go undetected because they are in
different courts or jurisdictions; or (5) an opponent detecting such a
conflict would rather impeach the lawyer with the conflict than move to
disqualify. For whatever reason, positional conflicts do not seem to give
115. Fed. Defenders of San Diego Inc., v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26
(D.D.C. 1988). Seventeen years later, mandatory application of the guidelines was ruled
unconstitutional. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
116. 680 F. Supp. at 32.
117. Id.at 29.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 30.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra pp. 110-11.
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rise to significant litigation, and therefore cases do not provide
significant guidance in this area. The most recent cases involve public
defenders, who cannot be fired, who cannot quietly drop one client to
eliminate a problem, and who have no financial conflict between clients
that might cause them to suppress a positional conflict.
C. State Ethics Opinions
State and local bar opinions that address positional conflicts have
drawn heavily from the ABA's ethics opinion, the Model Rules and the
Restatement.
Like these authorities, most bar associations have
concluded that a positional conflict before the same judge may create a
conflict under Rule 1.7, but one to which clients may usually consent
after full disclosure.
On the other hand, wary of the practical
implications of an ethical prohibition on positional conflicts, and aware
of the difficulty of separating innocuous conflicts from the more serious,
two states have concluded that a legal positional conflict is not a conflict
of interest. Even those states that do not find a positional conflict to be a
conflict of interest, however, recommend that attorneys disclose the
problem to affected clients.
No conflict. The Bars of California and Maine have determined that
a legal positional conflict is not a conflict of interest, even when the
attorney argues opposite sides of an issue before the same court. The
1989 opinion of the California State Bar Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct was based on a scenario in
which the attorney had to argue contrary legal positions in two cases
pending in federal court, assigned to the same judge. The committee
characterized these facts as the "'worst case' scenario presented by the
so-called 'issues conflict' conundrum."1 23 The committee noted the
possibility of creating adverse precedent for a client, and the damage to
the attorney's credibility before the court, but nevertheless refused to
find an ethical violation.
The committee noted that positional conflicts are "common and
prolific in our adversarial system of justice. Almost daily the litigator or
transactional attorney finds himself or herself taking positions on behalf
of clients which are antithetical to another client."' 24 The committee
concluded that to impose a burden of disclosure and consent on all
positional conflicts would be extreme and diminish the availability of
attorneys. It also determined that it would be impossible to craft a rule
that could distinguish between serious and trivial positional conflicts:
123.

Cal. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. No.

1989-108 1,2 (1989).
124.

Id. at 3.
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If it were possible to proscribe the nondisclosure and non-consensual
representation defined by our hypothetical without improperly
infringing on the types of inherent "issues conflicts" which occur
commonly and which cannot even be fairly detected by even the most
dedicated practitioner, we would not hesitate to do so. We must
conclude that these most rare and extreme scenarios where potential
harm is high nevertheless
must yield, as they have in other instances,
25
to higher priorities.
The committee did recommend, however, that the prudent attorney
disclose a positional conflict where there was reason to believe clients
might otherwise be harmed, and noted that there might be civil liability
for such harm in certain circumstances. 126 (The committee did not
explain what that harm might be, and it is difficult to imagine, absent
some additional act or omission by the attorney). Thus the committee
seemed to recognize a potential for harm, but deemed a rule against
positional conflicts unworkable.
Similarly the Maine Professional Ethics Commission rejected the
approach of the ABA 1993 ethics opinion and concluded that "an 'issue
conflict,' without more, is not a conflict of interest."' 127 The commission
was in part influenced by its view that screening for positional conflicts
would be extremely burdensome, and that there was little real need: "We
decline to interpret [the conflict rules] to require the bar to adopt
screening procedures for issue conflicts which experience tells us are, in
any event, extremely rare."' 128 But while the commission did not find a
conflict of interest, it noted that arguing opposite sides of the same issue
before the same judge or judges could violate other rules requiring the
lawyer to employ "reasonable care and skill" and to "employ the
lawyer's best judgment."'' 29 The Maine Commission found that it would
not be possible to define in advance when these rules of competence and
judgment would be implicated 30by a positional conflict, but that it would
depend on the particular facts.
May be Conflict of Interest. A number of state ethics opinions find
that while not all positional conflicts present an ethical problem, arguing
125. Id. The committee also rejected arguments that the positional conflict violated
the ethical requirements of competence and loyalty. Id. at 4-5.
126. The committee did not elaborate on the potential for civil liability, but merely
stated, "beyond client considerations, the attorney must keep in mind the potential for
civil liability if harm to the clients does occur which might have been avoided by timely
disclosure." Id. at 4.
127. Board of Overseers of the Bar, Prof'l Ethics Comm'n, Op. No. 155 (Me. 1997),
citing Reporter's Notes to Maine Bar Rule 3.4(b), 1993 revision.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Maine Bar Rule 3.6).
130. Id.
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opposite sides of the same legal issue before the same appellate court is a
conflict of interest. Most, but not all, find that it may be cured by client
consent.
Arizona and Philadelphia bar opinions find that arguing contrary
legal positions before the same appellate court creates a conflict of
interest that must be disclosed and consented to by both clients. Like the
California Committee, the Philadelphia committee assumed that
positional conflicts were common:
Practices throughout the country all have lawyers who go into court
on one day and argue an interpretation of the law for custody for a
mother and the next day go into a different court in a different case
and argue a different13interpretation for a father. This is the essence of
what a lawyer does. 1
Unlike the California committee, the Philadelphia committee saw
no difficulty in recognizing a conflict of interest, but limited the ethical
problem to contrary legal arguments in the same appellate court. The
Philadelphia opinion finds that the conflict is imputed to all of the
lawyer's partners and suggests that there may be instances when even
consent would be inadequate to cure the conflict, but does not elaborate
on what those circumstances might be. 132 The Arizona opinion, on the
other hand, states that a legal positional conflict can always be cured by
consent:
[W]e do not believe that the presentation of purely legal arguments
before an appellate court is the sort of situation that automatically
vitiates the informed consent of the clients involved to Law Firm A's
continued involvement. Appellate judges are presumably trained to
recognize that advocates are often required to take positions contrary
to those previously taken by their partners, when the interests of a
client so require. We cannot conclude that the judges of the Ninth
Circuit will be prejudiced against one side or the other in either of the
two cases at issue simply because of Law Firm A's involvement.
The questioning at oral argument may be somewhat uncomfortable
for the lawyers involved, but we cannot conclude
that the situation
133
will necessarily prejudice either of the clients.
A District of Columbia Bar opinion illustrates some of the problems
with the prevailing approach to positional conflicts. The opinion
responded to an inquiry by a private attorney who regularly represented
children and foster parents involved in the child welfare system and had

131.
132.
133.

Philadelphia Ethics Op. No. 89-27 supra note 11.
Id.
Ariz. Ethics Op. No. 87-15 (1987).

2006]

LEGAL DOUBLETALK

been asked to serve as outside general counsel to an association of foster
parents. 34 The bar opinion began with the assumption that same day
contrary legal arguments in the same appellate court would be a conflict
of interest. For less stark situations, the court referred to the factors set
forth in the ABA ethics opinion, and suggested that with far-flung offices
in large firms, the conflict might not always be imputed. 35 The opinion
implied that client consent could cure any positional conflict.' 3 6 The
opinion did not address what would seem to be the greater danger: that a
positional conflict would not materialize because the attorney's greater
allegiance would be to the larger, repeat client.
The District of Columbia opinion concluded that because most of
the attorney's work was in one or two city courts, "[i]t would be ethically
impermissible for her to take simultaneously inconsistent positions on
issues of law on behalf of different clients in those two courts without the
informed consent of all of her affected clients where the representation of
one client creates a substantial likelihood that her success on behalf of
one client might substantially impact another client adversely." 137 The
opinion thus seems to strengthen incentives not to raise conflicting
arguments.
The opinion recommended that the attorney alert her individual
clients that she represented the foster parent organization, inasmuch as
she may become identified in the eyes of the court as the representative
of that organization's interests. It also suggested the possibility of a
prospective waiver by the organization, although it did not advise such
advance waivers by individual
clients, who were "unsophisticated
138
consumer[s] of legal services."'
Faced with a similar power imbalance between clients, the New
York City Bar Association addressed pro bono representation of
complainants before the City Human Rights Commission by attorneys
who also represented respondents before the Commission on unrelated
cases.' 39 The opinion advised the attorneys to make an independent
determination of any perceived conflict but otherwise approved of such
134. D.C. Ethics Op. No. 265 (1996).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Formal Ethics Op. No. 1990-4 (1990). The
Association adopted an earlier draft of the Restatement comment on positional conflicts,
which distinguished between "representation with 'indirect precedential effect on another
client's legal position' (which presents no conflict) and 'arguing both sides of an
unsettled point of law before the same tribunal on behalf of different clients' (which
presents a conflict because 'the argument in each case would inevitably affect the
other.')." Id. (quoting ALl Proposed Restatement, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
§ 209, cmt. (f) (tent. Draft No. 3, April 10, 1990)).
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pro bono representation. As in the District of Columbia situation, the
greater danger here seems to be not positional conflicts but that the pro
bono attorneys would not raise issues likely to annoy paying clients.
Like the District of Columbia opinion, the New York opinion does not
address this danger.
A Michigan ethics opinion takes the most rigid stance against
positional conflicts, finding that arguing opposite sides of the same issue
before the state supreme court would create a conflict requiring the
lawyer to withdraw from both cases, regardless of client consent.140 That
rigid stance is no doubt explained by the attorney's extreme situation. In
the facts before the Committee the lawyer found himself arguing
conflicting legal positions in consolidated cases before the same court.' 4 1
Similarly, a New Mexico ethics opinion takes the position that a
positional conflict in the same trial or appellate court would violate the
rule against conflicts of interest, regardless of consent.1 42 Attorney
credibility seems to be the implicit concern with these "same court"
positional conflicts.
D. State ProfessionalConduct Rules
The majority of states that adopted the 1983 Model Rules also
adopted the original comment that maintained the distinction between
positional conflicts in trial and appellate courts. But
a number have
45
amended their rules to adopt the 2002 ABA comment.1
One state had addressed positional conflicts in the text of the rule
140. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. RI108 1, 2 (1991). "Under these circumstances a disinterested lawyer could not reasonably
conclude that the representation of the client would not be adversely affected." Id.
141. Id. at 1.
142. The New Mexico decision states that the lawyer "should not attempt the dual
representation." New Mexico Advisory Opinion No. 1990-3. Where the positional
conflict is in some other context, the lawyer should seek the consent of the clients to
proceed. Id.
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. para. 24 (2005). At least sixteen
states have adopted the new comment to rule 1.7: AiK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); Aiuz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 23 (2006); DEL. PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24
(2005); BURNS IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); IOWA RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.7, cmt. 24 (2005); MD. R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); MINN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. (abbreviated version of Model Rule comment); NEB. CT.
RULES, CODE OF PROF'L RESP. R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); N.C. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt.
24 (2006); PENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); S.C. App. CT. R. 407,
R. 1.7, cmt. 22 (2005); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2005); TENN. SUP.
CT. R. 1.7, cmt. 13 (2006); UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006); WYO. PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2006). Massachusetts has provided its own comment, stressing
that occasionally a positional conflict may be non-consentable. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 9.
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itself. Oregon's former Code of Professional Responsibility stated that a
positional conflict constitutes a conflict of interest only if a lawyer
knows his or her firm represents conflicting positions and knows that one
representation will adversely affect the other:
A conflict of interest is not present solely because one or more
lawyers in a firm assert conflicting legal positions on behalf of
different clients whom the lawyers represent in factually unrelated
cases. If, however, a lawyer actually knows of the assertion of the
conflicting positions and also actually knows that an outcome
favorable to one client in one case will adversely affect the client in
another case, the lawyer may not continue with both representations
or permit the other lawyers at43the same firm to do so unless all clients
consent after full disclosure. 1
Under the former Oregon rule, the certainty of adverse precedential
effect made a positional conflict a conflict of interest, but only where the
lawyer knew of the certainty. Thus, firms would not be responsible for
unwitting positional conflicts. But might such a rule encourage lawyers
to avert their eyes and try not to learn of the positions taken by their
partners? The rule
required "actual" knowledge; constructive knowledge
144
enough.
not
was
The District of Columbia rejected a much broader rule on positional
conflicts in 1986:
Proposed Rule 1.7(b)(5) would have required a lawyer to make full
disclosure and to seek client consent where other interests of a client
will be or are likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer's
assumption of such representation, and the proposed commentary
said that the protected client interests would be as broad as business
45
rivalry or personal differences between two potential clients. 1
The proposed rule met with strong opposition on the grounds that it
threatened lawyer independence as well as lawyers' willingness and
ability to represent unpopular and pro bono clients. 146 The rule
ultimately adopted went in the opposite
direction of the proposed rule
47
and affirmed lawyer independence. 1
143. OR. CODE

DR 5-105(A)(3)(2004), superseded by OR.
R. 1.7 (2005).
144. Another approach might be to require actual knowledge, but also consider the
reasonableness of the lawyer's knowledge in light of whether the lawyer maintained an
effective system for checking conflicts. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt.
11.
145. D.C. Ethics Op. No. 265 (1996).
146. Id.
147. Id. The current District of Columbia rule instead contains language limiting
client control over the positions attorneys take in unrelated matters:
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
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Neither the proposed nor adopted rule expressly mentioned
positional conflicts, although both could be read to cover them. The real
target of the final rule is business conflicts and preserving lawyers'
independence from powerful clients. The D.C. Bar correctly gave

prominence to this concern; the ethics rules cannot force lawyers to act
independently of their powerful clients, but they should not forbid them
from doing so.

IV.

The Real Dangers: Business Conflicts and Credibility Concerns
The preceding review of authorities on positional conflicts shows

that a positional conflict is not presently seen as a per se conflict of
interest and therefore not a per se ethical violation. These authorities cite
several key factors in analyzing whether a positional conflict rises to the
level of an ethical violation: (1) the issue's importance to the cases and
clients, (2) the potential that one representation will lead to adverse

precedent for the other, and, to a lesser extent, (3) incentives to favor one
client over the other and (4) credibility problems.
This prevailing approach to positional conflicts is wrong because it
diverts attention away from the real ethical dangers. In fact, business
pressures are the more prevalent force in practice, and even a soft rule
against positional conflicts serves to aggravate these economic conflicts.

A client may, on occasion, adopt unreasonable positions with respect to having
the lawyer who is representing that client also represent other parties. Such an
unreasonable position may be based on an aversion to the other parties being
represented by a lawyer, or on some philosophical or ideological ground having
no foundation in the rules regarding representation of conflicting interests.
Whatever difficulties may be presented for the lawyer in such circumstances as
a matter of client relations, the unreasonable positions taken by a client do not
fall within the circumstances requiring notification and consent. Clients have
broad discretion to terminate their representation by a lawyer and that
discretion may generally be exercised on unreasonable as well as reasonable
grounds.
A lawyer retained for a limited purpose may not be aware of the full range of a
client's other interests or positions on issues. Except in matters involving a
specific party or parties, a lawyer is not required to inquire of a client
concerning the full range of that client's interests in issues, unless it is clear to
the lawyer that there is a potential for adversity between the interests of clients
of the lawyer. Where lawyers are associated in a firm within the meaning of
Rule 1.10(a), the rule stated in the preceding sentence must be applied to all
lawyers and all clients in the firm. Unless a lawyer is aware that representing
one client involves seeking a result to which another client is opposed, Rule 1.7
is not violated by a representation that eventuates in the lawyer's unwittingly
taking a position for one client adverse to the interests of another client. The
test to be applied here is one of reasonableness and may turn on whether the
lawyer has an effective conflict checking system in place.
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 8 & 11.
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The focus on positional conflicts as potential conflicts of interest only
reinforces the power of wealthy clients and restricts client access to
counsel of choice, especially for poor or low income clients. (This
restrictive effect is magnified by the concentration of attorneys in large
firms where a conflict is imputed to hundreds of other lawyers). The
concern with creating adverse precedent has more to do with strategic
credibility than with true conflicts of interest. Thus, a rule against
positional conflicts is ill-advised.
At the same time, positional conflicts raise credibility problems that
cannot be ignored by the prudent lawyer. There is a tension between the
conclusion that there should be no rule against positional conflicts and
the acknowledgment of these credibility problems. This tension cannot
be entirely eliminated but is best resolved by allowing positional
conflicts.
Where clients or lawyers are uncomfortable with the
credibility implications of the conflict, the lawyer may withdraw. Where
counsel is appointed, courts should grant a motion to withdraw from a
positional conflict, as will be shown by the example of the public
defender. Thus, the ethics rules should not force lawyers to treat a
positional conflict as a disqualifying conflict of interest, but neither
should a lawyer be forced to proceed with a positional conflict over the
objection of the client and/or attorney where it creates strategic
credibility problems.
A.

Business Conflicts-Not PositionalConflicts-Are the Problem

Since the ABA first addressed positional conflicts in the 1983
comments to Model Rule 1.7, positional conflicts have been analyzed
primarily as a particular kind of conflict of interest. This focus has lead
to some confusion about the nature of the problem, however, as a legal
positional conflict by itself is a faulty indicator of a conflict of interest.
In fact, when a lawyer actually takes conflicting positions on behalf of
separate clients, it shows that any conflict may have been overcome.
Absent any significant self-interested reason for a lawyer to favor one
client over 148
the other, a positional conflict does not present a true conflict
of interest.
The more serious problem occurs when a lawyer favors one client
over the other for business reasons and therefore suppresses a positional
148. The lawyer may be faced with competing objectives by clients and other
conflicts for his time, etc., but the representation itself is not infected with the temptation
to use confidential info. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, Legal Responses to Conflicts of
Interest, ch. 13 in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS,
LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY

191 (Moore, Cain, Loewenstein, Bazerman, eds.,

Cambridge University Press 2005) (noting that law is most concerned with conflicts
infected by self-interest).
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conflict by either not raising the argument for the less favored client or
by tailoring it so that it does not conflict with the argument for the more
favored client. 149 There are many ways in which this may happen. The
lawyer may leave out a meritorious argument, make a much narrower
argument than he or she otherwise would, or argue for a much broader
interpretation of a rule than would an attorney who did not have the
business conflict. A lawyer who argues for a broad interpretation of a
rule so that it will include both clients may be foregoing a narrow
argument for one client, a narrow argument that a court would be more
likely to accept. On the other hand, a lawyer who makes only a narrow
argument may be forgoing a broad policy argument that might appeal to
some decision-makers. 150 And of course, lawyers may also avoid a
positional conflict by simply dropping or refusing the representation of
the less favored client.
A clever lawyer can often figure out how to avoid a positional
conflict by narrowing the arguments in each representation or by
distinguishing the cases factually. Such strategies may be in the best
interests of the clients; it may be strategically wise to ask for the
narrowest ruling. A lawyer may sincerely believe the distinctions are
sound and that there is no conflict between the positions. But where the
strategy is influenced by the lawyer's duties to another client a conflict
may be present. Such a conflict will be difficult to detect. Where the
arguments are not in direct conflict, it will be hard to show a positional
conflict of interest. 151 Thus, the more serious threat to disinterested
representation is business conflicts in general, not positional conflicts per
se.
A business conflict between clients is not usually a disqualifying
conflict of interest, nor should it be. A business conflict is defined as
"the risk of loss of business from having a firm member be perceived to
adopt a ...position that one of the firm's clients might not like." 1 52 In
our capitalist system, lawyers are expected to face and overcome
economic pressures to the extent they must provide disinterested and
competent representation to all clients. The rules do not require lawyers
to avoid business conflicts,1 53 but lawyers are expected not to let such
149. See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 509-10.
150. See Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 484-85 (discussing more examples).
151. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., Nos. 3-96-CV-1480BD, 3-96-CV-1608-BD, 2001 WL 1524433 at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2001) (denying
disqualification motion where attorney could reconcile potentially conflicting arguments

about corporate alter ego doctrine).
152. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 61.
153. The rules do restrict the economic stake an attorney can have in a case and limit
business transactions with clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8. But the
rules do not forbid the kind of economic pressure a lawyer will feel from wanting to keep
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economic pressure actually materially impair representation.
Nevertheless, research has shown the strength of these business
conflicts in suppressing positional conflicts. Attorneys in larger firms
face significant pressure from clients not to undertake cases that go
against their interests, even if unrelated to their representation by the
firm. 54 As one large firm lawyer put it, "We know what side our bread
is buttered on, and we stay there." 155 This pressure is particularly strong
when it comes to considering pro bono representation that might conflict
with the interests of paying clients, and the pressure may come from
56
other lawyers in the firm who simply fear alienating important clients.
Lawyers will tend to conform their conduct to their own business
interests, which are the same as those of their valuable clients. This
conformity in many instances will be almost unthinking and automatic.
Psychological research shows that when a person's self-interest is
involved in a decision, the self-interest operates automatically and
outside of conscious awareness to cause the person to prefer a certain
course of action. Conscious reason then rationalizes this choice. 57 Such
research supports the hypothesis that lawyers faced with potential
positional conflicts will find a way to avoid them without much
agonizing by reframing arguments or refusing representation. 58 The
positional conflict will never materialize, and the lawyer's business
interest in one or both clients is maintained.

or attract business.
154. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1167. Using the term "positional conflict" to mean
simply clients with differing interests, the author writes:
Positional conflicts are world-class business conflicts, especially when the
positions in contention are deeply held by large, powerful, repeat-playing
institutions-the staple of large law firms. Again, the difficulties engendered
by positional conflicts are rarely legal ones; they are about business, client
relations, and intra-firm politics, about how to serve the needs of important
clients without undermining or alienating others.
Id.
155. Spaulding, supra note 45, at 1409 (quotations omitted).
156. See id. at 1415. In another survey,
One question asked attorneys how their organizations dealt with matters that
might prove objectionable to clients, other lawyers, or the community. Another
question asked how satisfied attorneys were with the types of cases that were
permitted. A relatively small number of lawyers answered these questions. Of
those who did, about two-fifths were in organizations that discouraged work
likely to advance positions inconsistent with client interests or values.
Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principleand in Practice,53 J. LEGAL ED. 413, 452-3
(2003). See also Gordon, supra note 19 (arguing that market forces cause law firms to
prohibit their lawyers from pro bono or other activities that could be perceived as
adopting a policy position that a client might not like).
157. Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the
Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES., 189, 190-991 (2004).
158. See discussion of Matthew Hale Carpenter, supra pp. 101-03.
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If business conflicts and the lawyer's own self-interest in
maintaining valuable clients are more prevalent than true legal positional
conflicts, a rule against positional conflicts becomes at best another
rationalization that supports the operation of the business conflict. (We
see this rationalization even in the confusion of the terms: many lawyers
use the term "positional conflict" to mean simply a business conflict). 59
At worst, the mere possibility of a positional conflict becomes a reason
to tailor, limit, or refuse representation, all in the service of the lawyer's
economic interests. An over-emphasis on avoiding positional conflicts
thus creates another incentive to behave in ways that favor powerful
clients at the expense of less powerful clients.
Of course, it is possible that where a lawyer has a positional
conflict, together with a business reason to favor one client over the
other, a true conflict of interest may arise. Where the attorney retains
both cases despite a significant business conflict, the danger is that the
attorney will soft-pedal the arguments in the less-favored case or
engineer the timing of arguments so that the favored case is decided first,
lessening the chance of adverse precedent from the disfavored case, but
potentially creating adverse precedent for the disfavored case.1 60 If the
positional conflict and the business conflict operate together in this way,
a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 may exist-but not necessarily.
Attorneys face conflicting business incentives all the time-in
determining which cases to prioritize, how much time to put into a case,
etc. Ironically, where a business conflict and a positional conflict coexist, it may actually mean that the business conflict has been overcome
to the extent that the positional conflict has not been suppressed. Senator
Matthew Hale Carpenter's 1872 positional conflict is an example of an
attorney arguing a pro bono case in a way that undermined the arguments
he made for his paying client. 1 6' The danger that the attorney will make
the argument ineffectively seems less of a threat to clients than the
danger that the lawyer will not make the argument at all; allowing a
positional conflict seems better than disallowing it and encouraging
lawyers to suppress the problem.
Thus, while business conflicts are pervasive and powerful, an overly
fastidious attention to business conflicts may lead to even greater
specialization and client identification, decreasing lawyer independence
and the general availability of legal services to unpopular or poorly
paying clients.

159.
160.
161.

See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21; Ringel, supra note 23.
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 488.
See supra note 6.
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B. Risk ofAdverse Precedentis Not Conflict of Interest
If the lawyer has no business reason to favor one client over the
other, a positional conflict is not a conflict of interest but rather an
indication that there is no conflict preventing the attorney from making
the contrary arguments. Yet, the ABA comments and much of the other
authority on positional conflicts state that a positional conflict will rise to
the level of a prohibited conflict of interest if there is a significant risk
that a "decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to
' 62
seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client."'
These authorities reason that where a lawyer's argument is meant to
create precedent favorable to one client but adverse to another, the
"representation of [the second] client will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client," in violation of Model Rule
1.7.
It is not clear how the risk of creating adverse precedent materially
limits representation of another client. One might argue that the creation
of adverse precedent does not really demonstrate a conflict of interest
because the precedent would have been created regardless of who made
the arguments. "It is for the court to sort out and apply the correct legal
principles. That being so, the involvement of a single lawyer on both
sides of an issue is no different from two lawyers who argue two
different sides before the same tribunal."1 63 Of course, such a conclusion
requires one to assume that all lawyers are equally competent.' 64 A
disparity in legal resources and lawyering skills might mean that the
potential of creating adverse precedent should be a greater concern for
the better or well-funded lawyer. If a particularly good lawyer works on
both sides of a legal issue equally well, that lawyer runs a risk of creating
adverse precedent that would not have been suggested by a less
competent lawyer. That might be a practical reason for a client to oppose
a positional conflict, but is it an ethical problem?
The rules of professional responsibility are usually blind to
economic or skill disparities. 165 We have yet to condition the operation
162.
163.
164.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 24 (2005).
Walther & Kass, supra note 44, at 139.
But see Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 488. Dzienkowski refutes this argument

with the observation that the lawyer can to some extent control the timing of the decision
by making or forgoing motions, and that "the strength of the facts and the lawyer's
persuasiveness in the first case to be decided may significantly influence the second
representation." Id. But Dzienkowski's refutation seems to rely on the workings of a
business or other conflict to influence a lawyer to favor one case over the other. If there
is really no business conflict between the two cases, then theoretically it should make no
difference to the outcome of the cases whether one or two lawyers or firms make the
contradictory arguments-if we assume that all lawyers are equally skilled.
165.

Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
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of the ethical rules on the resources of individual clients and lawyers,
usually assuming that all lawyers are equally competent and that
alternative counsel is always available, although it is clear these
assumptions are not empirically valid. 166 In any event, the varying skill
levels of attorneys are unrelated to the harm a positional conflict rule is
directed at: the rule is not to ensure skilled representation, but to prevent
a lawyer from working against the client's interest.
More importantly, while lawyers certainly have a hand in shaping
the law, ultimately it is not the lawyer who "causes" the precedent, but
the court that issues it. The authorities agree that adverse precedent
resulting from an earlier representation does not create a conflict of
interest, 67 nor does adverse precedent that might result from a
concurrent representation in another (unpersuasive) jurisdiction. It is
difficult to see how the risk of creating adverse precedent in one case
really "materially limits" the representation,although the precedent may
certainly negatively affect the second client-especially if the creation of
adverse precedent before the representation does not materially limit it. 17
The real problem with representation that may lead to adverse
precedent for another client-regardless of whether it is in the trial or
appellate court-is one of credibility. The client, and perhaps the public,
will understandably be upset to learn that the lawyer has been working
successfully against the client's interests. A client is entitled to know
that the risk of such precedent exists-as a matter of courtesy and as part
of the lawyer's obligation to "reasonably consult" with the client about
ConfrontingLies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIz. L.
REv. 829, 838 (2002), noting "fictions of symmetry" in the Model Rules, including the
fiction that all lawyers are equally competent.
166. See, e.g., Walther & Kass, supra note 44, at 139 ("Assuming equal competence,
neither client is more harmed by a single lawyer arguing a conflicting position than by
two lawyers doing so.").
167. See note 82, supra, and accompanying text.
171. A less frequently mentioned risk in positional conflicts is the danger that the
lawyer will be doing the opponent's legal work. Dzienkowski discusses the danger of
sending opposing arguments out into "the public domain." Dzienkowski, supra note 13,
at 490. He notes this is more of a problem when there is a great difference in legal
resources-i.e. when the positionally conflicted lawyer is particularly well-funded or
good. Id. An opponent who discovers these public arguments from another case will
realize an advantage he or she would not otherwise have had. The growth of the intemet
since Dzienkowski originally made this point in 1993 has significantly increased the
likelihood that one's opponent will have easy access to all one's publicly submitted
documents.
Most discussions of positional conflicts assume that the law and arguments about the
law are equally accessible to all lawyers. In real life, of course, there can be great
disparities in legal resources and the quality of lawyering. If these disparities exist, an
opponent's discovery of an attorney's contrary arguments in another case might not only
allow the opponent to question the attorney's credibility, but also provide the opponent
with arguments and briefing the opponent would not otherwise have developed.
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how to accomplish the client's objectives. 168 However, the mere fact that
a lawyer's legal argument in one case might lead to precedent adverse to
another client does not create a conflict of interest where one otherwise
would not exist.
C. Credibility Concerns
Even if a pure legal positional conflict is not by itself a conflict of
interest, and even if the greater problem is business conflicts, a positional
conflict creates problems of credibility. While these concerns do not rise
to the level of an ethical violation, a lawyer arguing out of both sides of
her mouth may have credibility issues with her client, the court, and the
public at large. How we evaluate these credibility problems turns on our
ideal of law practice and whether we value more greatly lawyer
independence from or loyalty to clients. An ethics code that clearly
allowed positional conflicts would do much to reduce these credibility
problems, but some credibility concerns would remain even for the
fiercest advocate of lawyer independence.
Both loyalty and independence can be portrayed as virtues or vices:
loyalty to the downtrodden but deserving client is a virtue, but loyalty to
the soulless corporation in its quest to avoid just compensation is "selling
out." A lawyer like Atticus Finch who has the independence to represent
with honor disparate interests in the same community is virtuous; 169 a
lawyer who will represent any side of a question as long as he is paid is
merely an unprincipled hired gun.
Commentators who come down more on the side of enforcing client
loyalty tend to urge recognition of positional conflicts.
John
Dzienkowski, who wrote a seminal article on positional conflicts,
recommended that the Model Rules be amended to suggest analyzing
positional conflicts in light of several factors similar to those eventually
adopted in the 1993 ABA ethics opinion and Restatement. 170 Professor
Dzienkowski believed that material positional conflicts violate client
expectations of loyalty and damage the legal171profession in the eyes of the
public. Others have echoed these concerns.
168.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4; Cal. Ethics Op. No. 1989-108 at 4.

169. While Atticus seemed willing to represent various interests-the wrongly
accused black man as well as some of the poor whites who wanted to hang him--one
suspects that he would not have pursued a dishonorable goal for his clients. See HARPER
LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Perennial Classics 1960).
170. Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 529.
171. See J. Vincent Aprile, II, Positional Conflicts and Criminal Justice Litigators,
CRIM. JUST. (Winter 2000) 56, 58. Aprile was really more concerned with the detrimental
effect such a conflict would have on the representation itself by undercutting credibility.
But he also believed that public defenders should not have positional conflicts imputed to
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Others, particularly those concerned about the availability of
lawyers for pro bono work, emphasize the need for attorney
independence from powerful clients. To these commentators, an ethical
prohibition of positional conflicts would exacerbate the difficulty legal
services organizations already face in trying to recruit lawyers to take on
cases that may go against the business or political interests of their
important clients. 172 In their view, clients already exert too much power
over their attorneys.
Obviously, not all clients have this kind of power. Lawyers whose
client base is primarily individuals ("personal plight cases") 73 may be
quite independent from the clients. Clients such as indigent criminal
defendants, legal services clients, or insureds-whose legal bills are paid
by others-may also have very little leverage over their attorneys.
Related to the tension between loyalty and independence is a more
fundamental question about the nature of the lawyer's work: should
lawyers mean what they say, or is it honorable to make arguments simply
because they serve the client's cause? 174 This question also is important
to the concerns raised about the lawyer's credibility in the context of
positional conflicts: if lawyers are hired guns, why does it undermine
their credibility to take conflicting legal positions? On the other hand,
does an attorney enjoy more or less credibility if she is clearly identified
with one kind of client?
In thinking about the question of attorney sincerity, it is helpful to
imagine the two extremes of practice: the hired gun (or, more positively,
the taxi cab driver) who will argue anything within the bounds of the law
and ethical rules; and the "true believer,"'' 75 always convinced of the
their entire firm.
172. See Spaulding, supra note 45, at 1433 (proposing that positional conflicts be
narrowly construed when the conflict is between a paying and a pro bono client).
Dzienkowski also recognized the pro bono problem, supporting a positional conflict
exception for law reform activities, but stopped short of an exception for litigation.
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 461. See also Ester F. Lardent, PositionalConflicts in the
Pro Bono Context: Ethical Considerations and Market Forces, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2279 (1999).
173. "Personal plight" cases have been defined as criminal defense, personal injury
plaintiffs work and divorce. Heinz et al., supra note 61, at 760.
174. This recurring debate surfaced again with the nomination of Judge John Roberts
to the Supreme Court. See Anne E. Komblut, Judging John Roberts; The Brie~fase
Carries Briefs, Not Necessarily Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, § 4, at 5
(discussing whether lawyers should be held accountable for the positions they advocate
on behalf of clients).
175. "True Believer" was also the name of a 1989 movie about a former civil rights
lawyer who ended up defending drug dealers. TRUE BELIEVER (Columbia Pictures 1989).
See also Carl M. Selinger, Dramatizing on Film the Uneasy Role of the American
CriminalDefense Lawyer: True Believer, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV 223 (1997). When I
practiced criminal defense law this term was frequently used to describe dedicated
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righteousness of his or her position.
The hired gun or taxicab is more in line with the traditional
professional ideal. The ethical canons emphasized, "[t]he obligation of
loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge of his
professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal
viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client.' ' 176 This view
1 77
and Model Rules. 178
has been repeated in the Restatement
Independence and detachment from client causes are part of the character
of the honorable lawyer put forth by Chief Justice Roberts at his
179
confirmation hearings.
The hired gun attorney certainly has his critics.
Richard
Wasserstrom has criticized the lawyer's role-differentiated morality and
specifically the practice of arguing positions in which the lawyer does
not believe:
If the lawyer does not in fact believe what is urged by way of
argument, if the lawyer is only playing a role, then it appears to be
proper to tax the lawyer with hypocrisy and insincerity. To be sure,
actors in a play take on roles and say things that the characters, not
the actors, believe. But we know it is a play and that they are actors.
The law courts are not, however, theaters, and the lawyers both talk
about justice and they genuinely seek to persuade. The fact that the
lawyer's words, thoughts, and convictions are, apparently, for sale
and at the service of the client helps us, I think, to understand the
peculiar hostility which is more180than occasionally uniquely directed
by lay persons toward lawyers.
Wasserstrom argues that the lawyer pays a heavy price for living this
way.
At the other end of the continuum from the hired gun, the "true
believer" identifies strongly with the client's cause. Some true believers
are motivated by pre-existing political beliefs.18 1 Others may come to
defense attorneys who were always completely convinced of the correctness of opposing
the prosecution, and contrasted to those more agnostic attorneys who could often see the
merits of their opponents' position.
176. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1980).
177.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 125, cmt. e (2000)

("Moreover, it is a tradition that a lawyer's advocacy for a client should not be construed
as an expression of the lawyer's personal views.").
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2004).
179. See supra note 3.
180. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS, 1-15 (1975), reprinted in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 159 (Geoffrey Hazard and Deborah L. Rhode, eds., Foundation Press 3d
ed., 1994).
181. Legal services lawyers, for example, may be drawn to their jobs by their strong
beliefs in social justice. Once there, a true believer will take on an identity and "mission"
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identify with their clients as a result of representing them over time. In
the end the lawyer who began as a hired gun persuades him or herself of
the client's position. As one commentator suggests, "[o]ne way that
lawyers deal with the problem of opportunism is to come to believe in
the arguments they make on behalf of their clients. For example,
defenders of tobacco companies may come to believe that the hazards of
smoking really have not been demonstrated sufficiently."'1 82 Another
observer suggests that many lawyers "do not perceive any disjunction
between personal morality and professional identity ....

Such lawyers

may improperly discount their professional obligations to third
parties by
' 83
so closely identifying with their clients' ends and interests."'
Although the "true believer" is sincere-unlike the hired gun-she
can also be perceived as a menace because she lacks detachment and
professionalism. Writing in opposition to the 2000 changes to the Model
Rule comments on positional conflicts, a family law lawyer and judge
claimed that positional conflicts rules would "deprive the court, and the
legal system, of the objectivity that the representation of both classes of
parties provides in this particularly emotion-laden field ....

Lawyers

will undoubtedly do a better job of dispute resolution if they do not
practice or model polarized thinking, which, after all, is recognized in
184
mental health circles to be a thought disorder."'
Rather than advocating the ethics of a true believer, many writers

to which their arguments must conform. See Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or
Monolithic Clients: PositionalConflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services
Lawyer, 67 FoRDHAm L. REV. 2339 (1999). "Cause lawyers" are "activist lawyers who
use the law as a means of creating social change in addition to a means of helping
individual clients .... The worry for the cause lawyer is that the pursuit of her 'cause'
may at times conflict with the client's interest." Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause
Lawyering: An EmpiricalExamination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1197 (2005).
182. J.M. Balkin, IdeologicalDrift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
869, 887 n.24 (1993). He goes on to say:
Of course, this is a solution to the problem of opportunism only if one believes
that reduction of cognitive dissonance by itself counts as a solution. Moreover,
it cannot serve as a solution for the lawyer who continually represents clients
with contradictory interests. Such a lawyer is more likely to come to believe in
the process rather than the client-that zealous representation of whatever
client is before her is adequate justification for her actions. The repeated
experience of being a hired gun causes her to believe in the propriety of being a
hired gun.
Id.
183. Spaulding, supra note 45, at 1429; Karl Llewellyn, too, noted the ease with
which lawyers come to believe in the justness of their clients' causes, especially when the
clients' cases are particularly profitable. KARL LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 178
(Oceana 1930).
184. Walther & Kass, supra note 44, at 138.
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defend the lawyer's role-differentiated ethics of argument.
Yet they
also acknowledge the accusations of dishonesty that will not go away.
James Boyd White has written an eloquent defense of the advocate who
does not necessarily endorse his client's cause. 186 In a dialogue based on
Plato's Georgias, the lawyers' defender states that while he may be
"insincere" in a certain sense when making an argument, he is
nevertheless honest because the judges and other advocates understand
his role. He argues that he acts with integrity because his implicit and
honest statement is that this is the best argument he can make for his
client given his resources.1 87 At the same time, White gives voice to the
contrary argument that a lawyer is little better than a prostitute who
serves neither his client's best interests nor justice. 188 Geoffrey Hazard
writes that while it is "profoundly unattractive" to admit that the
advocate's presentation is a theatrical enterprise rather than the lawyer's
honest assessment of the case, requiring lawyers to take on the truthfinding function of the judge would not result in justice. 189 Yet he
acknowledges that many involved are unhappy with the theatrical roleplaying: "The judges are unhappy knowing that the best they can get is
verisimilitude....

Many lay critics and some academicians condemn

both the advocates' artifice and the artificers, without coming to terms
with the fundamental difficulty that begets the role of advocate in the
first place."'1 90 These comments reflect a widespread discomfort with the
adversarial process to which we are nevertheless committed.
On the spectrum between hired gun and true believer, most lawyers
probably fall somewhere in the middle or travel between the poles. Most
advocates acknowledge the importance of demonstrating a belief in one's
185. Note HAZARD & HODES, supra note 52 at § 10.10, illustration 10-2, discussion of
a positional conflict before the same judge:
Although some might say that the spectacle of the same lawyer arguing both
sides of the same proposition damages the image of the legal profession, it can
also be said that it instead shows the profession at its best. So long as there are
non-frivolous arguments to be made, lawyers should be proud to acknowledge
that as detached professionals they are capable of asserting either side.
Id. With respect to legal education, Anthony Kronman defends the case method as
teaching students to entertain multiple positions, "strengthening their moral imagination
and encouraging them to take a more cosmopolitan view of the diversity of human
goods...." ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 160 (Belknap Press 1993). He

notes that many students experience this education as unmooring them from their former
ideals.
186.

JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF

THE LAW 215-37 (The University of Wisconsin Press 1985).

187.
188.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 218-19.

189. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in
ETHICS INPRACTICE 83, (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).

190.

Id. at 83.
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case in order to be persuasive.' 9' Yet several also warn against the
danger of becoming too closely identified with the case: "Once a lawyer
starts crusading, he loses the objectivity he needs, he begins to slop over,
he rapidly diminishes his effectiveness, and he becomes that stock,
hackneyed and yet constantly reappearing character, the lawyer who
192
represents himself and who in consequence has a fool for a client."
When advocates discuss the need to have a belief in the correctness of
one's case, they often discuss how to induce this belief through
preparation. 193 The "sincere belief' of the advocate comes to resemble
the sincere beliefs that an actor conveys after similar preparation.
Thus, there is far from unanimity on the proper attitude of the
attorney toward the sincerity of his or her position. Karl Llewellyn has
suggested that there is no agreement on the proper attitude because all
lawyers are sometimes happy with the hired gun ethic and sometimes
earnest believers in their clients' causes. He told law students in his
1930 lecture that the two ethical norms are "completely respectable,
accepted, impeccable, and either of which is always available,"
depending on which appears convenient to the lawyer at the time.' 94
This ambivalence makes it difficult to develop a clear rule for lawyer
credibility with positional conflicts, and may help explain the varying
approaches taken by different jurisdictions. Nevertheless, a positional
conflict will raise credibility questions even for the staunchest defenders
of the hired gun or taxicab ethic. These problems will arise for three
principle audiences: the court(s), client(s), and the public.
The Court. "[T]he most important object of inquiry in a study of
persuasion is not the author but the audience to whom the argument is
addressed. After all, those who make arguments, whether manipulatively
or with conviction, do so in order to influence others."' 195 Judges well
understand that lawyers are not necessarily arguing in accord with their
personal opinions when they take a position in court. At least one bar
ethics opinion declined to find that appellate judges would be prejudiced
against either side when presented with opposing arguments by the same
firm:
"Appellate judges are presumably trained to recognize that
advocates are often required to take positions contrary to those
previously taken by their partners, when the interests of a client so
191.

GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 58-59 (St. Martin's Press

1995); DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 33 (West Group 2003);
FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS 359 (Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. 1967).
192. WIENER, supra note 195, at 357.
193. SPENCE, supra note 195; FREDERICK, supra note 195, at 34; WIENER, supra note

195.
180.

194.

LLEWELLYN, supra note 187, at

195.

Jerry Frug, Argument as Character,40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 881 (1988).
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require. ' 96 Hazard and Hodes, by defending the ethics of a pure legal
positional conflict before the same judge, also seem
to assume that the
197
court.
the
with
suffer
not
will
credibility
advocate's
But several authorities and commentators state the opposite:
consciously or subconsciously, judges will question the credibility of an
advocate who makes contrary legal arguments before the same
tribunal.1 98 Other sources, while not expressly commenting on a loss of
credibility before the court, seem to assume such a problem when
drawing9 the ethical line at presenting opposing arguments in the same
9
court. 1

Could any credibility problem from a positional conflict be
eliminated by mutual agreement between bench and bar that a positional
conflict poses no ethical concern? That is, if we all agreed that lawyers
should be allowed to argue contrary positions-even in the same courtwould judges adopt Hazard's position that to argue contrary positions
actually shows the profession in its noblest light? It is unlikely that the
profession could get rid of the entire credibility problem in this way.200
The practice of law is not like a moot court competition or debate round.
Judges in real cases are trying to decide what is right-it is a serious
enterprise, "tak[ing] place in a field of pain and death., 20 '1 Given the
seriousness of the enterprise, most judges (consciously or not) prefer
lawyers who at least appear to also be serious as well. Nevertheless, if
there were mutual agreement, as apparently existed in the Nineteenth
Century, it could greatly diminish the credibility problems associated
with a positional conflict.
Some credibility problems will remain, however, because of the
importance of ethos or character in argument. While "[t]he daily
experience of using arguments and counterarguments interchangeably
gives lawyers and judges such a distant (sometimes cynical) attitude
196.

Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 87-15 (1987).

197. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 52, at 10-33.
198. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993);
Dzienkowski, supra note 13, at 489-90; Aprile, supra note 175, at 58.
199. See supra Part III(C).

200. In an article criticizing the rule against lawyers vouching for clients, Thomas L.
Shaffer argues that modem American lawyers have attempted unsuccessfully to take the
character of the advocate out of advocacy, mostly in order to prevent the inconvenient
consequences of vouching on lawyer's careers. These consequences include that lawyers
would have to vouch in every case or the courts would wonder at the absence of
vouching, and that lawyers who were not known in the community would have a
disadvantage. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching for
Clients: Advocacy and "The Manner That is The Man Himself" 7 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS AND PUB. POL'Y 145, 158-59 (1993). Shaffer argues that it is impossible to

remove the influence of the advocate's character.
201.

Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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toward arguments that their arguments often seem characterless,
character is nevertheless important. 20 3 As Aristotle wrote,

' 20 2

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe
good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely
true where exact
20 4
certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.
An effective argument causes the listener or reader to identify with the
character of the advocate. 20 5 If the character of the advocate is that of a
chameleon who can argue two sides of the same question, how will that
character help persuade the decision-maker? To the extent that argument
is based on a particular type of character (e.g., champion of entrepreneur,
defender of the little guy) can these two types be credibly represented by
the same person or same firm? Is it too much to ask the court to see it as
a performance? Is not the very
two-facedness of the positional conflict
20 6
revealing of a bad character?
When discussing an advocate's character, one might refer to
character in a number of senses: reputational character the advocate
brings; the character of the advocate revealed through the argument; and
the character of the argument itself. The lines between these different
kinds of character will not always be clear, and character itself can be
multidimensional and always changing.20 7 Reputational character might
include such things as the speaker's background, education, and firm
association. Justice Blackmun's notes on oral arguments demonstrate
that this kind of character could definitely influence his assessment of
credibility. 20 8 But the argument itself, as Aristotle noted, will also reveal
202.
203.

Frug, supra note 199, at 896.
Frug, supra note 199; AMANDA ANDERSON, THE WAY WE ARGUE Now: A STUDY
IN THE CULTURES OF THEORY 134-60 (Princeton University Press 2006).
204. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 7 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 2004).
205. Frug, supra note 199.
206. By several accounts, the Solicitor General and his attorneys have the highest
credibility as advocates before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rebecca Deen & Joseph
Ignagni, IndividualJustices and the Solicitor General: The Amicus Curiae Cases, 19532000, 89 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (2005); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law
Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33, 47 (2004). One important
reason for that credibility is probably that the Solicitor General's positions are the
considered positions of the executive branch, and not paid for by private actors. (Of
course, some will argue that these positions are influenced by powerful private interests).
The Solicitor General's office cannot have a positional conflict because it has only one
client.
207. Frug, supra note 199, at 876.
208. See generally LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN, (2005),
showing that Blackmun graded oral argument performances. Political scientists who
have analyzed his grades show a strong connection between the advocate's social status
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character. Even the most stellar reputation and background will not
make up for an argument that is churlish, sullen or disrespectful. Finally,
the terms of the argument itself may appeal to a certain kind of character:
authoritarian, vengeful, merciful, etc. A positional conflict will not
necessarily diminish the lawyer's performanceof character in all of these
senses, but it might affect the court's acceptance of that performance.
No matter what one's position on whether a good lawyer must
believe what she says, the sense of commitment is an important asset for
an advocate. Judges committed to an ethic of independence can ignore
positional conflicts up to a point, but the advocate's credibility will
suffer--or at least the advocate will lose a strategic asset-if the judge is
faced with the same lawyer arguing opposing positions. To a lesser
extent this might also be true if two lawyers from the same firm take
opposing positions. 2°9
While these credibility problems can never be completely
eliminated, removing the ethical rule against positional conflicts could
reduce them greatly. If the profession were to unequivocally endorse the
character of the taxi-driver, the honest advocate, as it did more fully in
Senator Carpenter's time, the credibility problems associated with
positional conflicts would lessen.
The Client. A client is unlikely to understand why he or she should
tolerate a positional conflict, especially in the same court. Perhaps some
clients can be made to understand the value of an independent bar, but
most will prefer a lawyer who is not at cross-purposes with their case.
To a client, a lawyer with a positional conflict will appear less than
entirely loyal.
(background, education, status of employer) and Blackmun's grade. Timothy R.
Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck , James F. Spriggs, II, Legal Argumentation before the U.S.
Supreme Court, at 29-30. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2004 annual meetings of
the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2-5. One reason for
this reputational advantage might be that advocates who went to Ivy League schools and
practiced with large Washington firms were more like the justices themselves and
therefore easier for the justices to identify with. Frug, supra note 199 (on the importance
of identifying with the speaker).
209. Given the importance of credibility to advocacy, should the impairment to
credibility caused by a positional conflict be analyzed as a threat to lawyer competence?
In some ways competency seems like a better analysis than conflict of interest because
the problems with credibility are strategic. But competency refers to "the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004), and it would seem to
be a stretch to include credibility within that definition. See California Ethics Opinion
No. 1989-108 (rejecting argument that positional conflict violates competency rule) and
Maine Ethics Opinion No. 155 (1997) (finding no per se conflict of interest from a
positional conflict, but suggesting that a contemporaneous positional conflict before the
same court could impair the lawyer's effectiveness to the extent that it would violate the
duty to employ "reasonable care and skill").
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Given this credibility problem with clients, do clients even need to
be told about positional conflicts? If a positional conflict is not a real
conflict of interest, as I've argued, then there is no requirement under
Model Rule 1.7 that clients be told about it. But lawyers also have an
obligation under Model Rule 1.4 to "reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished."
Thus, lawyers should inform clients of significant
positional conflicts, especially where a victory for one client will result
in adverse precedent for the other, or where the lawyer's credibility will
be detrimentally affected by the conflict. The client can then choose
whether to proceed with the positional conflict or retain a different
attorney. The California Ethics committee opinion suggests that there
might even be malpractice liability if harm to the client 2"might
have been
10
avoided by timely disclosure" of the positional conflict.
The Public. Lawyers already have significant credibility problems
with the public, and many lawyer jokes seem based on the lawyer's lack
of honesty. 21 1 The negative effect of even a factual positional conflict
was a primary concern of the court in Estates Theatres, Inc., v. Columbia
Pictures Indus.21 2 The public is not impressed with the ethic of
"independence" when lawyers talk out of both sides of their mouths.21 3
In addition to these potential credibility problems with the courts,
clients and the public, the lawyer with a positional conflict may have a
credibility problem with the lawyer self-the lawyer's self-respect. The
lawyer's discomfort with a positional conflict will depend on where the
attorney falls on the hired-gun/true believer continuum. For true
believers, if the positional conflict involves an issue important to the
case, it will be difficult to achieve that state of "sincere belief' that many
say is necessary for effective advocacy. 1 4 Others, who endorse the
taxicab ethic, may have little or no difficulty. 21 5 Where a positional
210. California Ethics Opinion 1989-108 at 4. See supra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
211. E.g., Q: How can you tell when a lawyer is lying? A: His lips are moving. This
and other jokes about lawyer dishonesty are collected in MARC GALANTER, LOWERING
THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 31-63 (2005).
212.

Seep. 119-20, supra.

213. For example, when the well-known lawyer Edward Bennett Williams made one
characterization of this client's sentence to the court and another to the press, one reporter
wrote in disgust, "words for hire. Words not for expression but for manipulation. Words
that do not emanate from some deep and honest center of a man, but rather from a bag of
tricks well learned." Jack Fuller, Words for hire add a disturbing note to the Helms case,

CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1977 (quoted in Robert Pack, Edward Bennett Williams for the
Defense, 37 (1983)).
214. WIENER, supra note 195; Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., v. United States,
680 F. Supp. 26 (D.C. DC 1988).
215. Roberts, Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3.
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conflict is imputed between firm members, rather than with a single
lawyer, the problem of credibility with the lawyer self disappears in most
instances.
D. An Example: The PublicDefender
It may be helpful to examine a particular positional conflict in
litigation to understand how a positional conflict might work. A recent
Delaware case, Williams v. State,2 16 provides a good example. The
positional conflict in that case was apparently a stark legal one. The
court described the conflict as follows:
[The lawyer] asserts that, on appeal, Williams could raise an arguable
issue that the Superior Court erred when it concluded it was required
to give "great weight" to the jury's 10-2 recommendation in favor of
the death penalty for Williams. [The lawyer] contends, however, that
he may have a conflict in presenting this argument because he has
advocated a contrary position on behalf of a different client in
another capital murder appeal pending before this Court. In Garden
v. State, Nos. 125 & 162, 2001, [the lawyer] argued in his opening
brief that the Superior Court erred when it failed to give great weight
to the jury's 2-10 vote rejecting the imposition of the death penalty
for Garden.
The lawyer in this case was a public defender who had no business
conflict between the two capital clients.21 7 Neither case would be more
profitable than the other; neither client paid for the representation. Thus
the real concern in representing both clients was the lawyer's credibility.
Along with the traditional concern with creating adverse precedent for
one client, the lawyer cited concerns about his credibility with the court
and his clients.21 8
The credibility problem is especially acute for a public defender,
whose credibility is somewhat tarnished to begin with. The public
defender does not choose cases, and there is a widespread impressionboth with the public and many on the bench-that most public defender
clients are guilty. The ethical rules regarding attorney truthfulness and
avoiding frivolous claims properly include exceptions for criminal
defense counsel in light of the criminal defendant's constitutional

216.
217.

805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002).
Confirmed in telephone interview with Bernard J.
appellant in Williams v. State, supra note 220.

O'Donnell, attorney for

218. "O'Donnell is concerned that his representation of both clients on this issue will
create the risk that an unfavorable precedent will be created for one client or the other.
O'Donnell also is concerned that it may invite questions about his credibility with this
Court and his clients' perception of his loyalty to each of them." 805 A.2d at 881.
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rights,2 19 and the danger to these rights if counsel were to become too
concerned with avoiding frivolous arguments. (For example, if defense
counsel had to worry about sanctions for frivolous claims, they might err
on the side of not raising arguable issues, and second-guessing their
client's testimony). But one effect of relaxing rules for truthfulness and
frivolity for criminal defense counsel is that the credibility of defense
counsel may be undermined. Courts may assume that an attorney is
simply "going through the motions" in a particular case, regardless of
whether the attorney is arguing in all sincerity. Thus, a public defender
cannot afford any additional credibility problem that a positional conflict
might add.
The public defender's credibility with clients can also be strained
since the client cannot choose or fire the attorney. A dedicated public
defender can overcome initial client skepticism by demonstrating her
commitment and competence, but a positional conflict will certainly
undermine those efforts.
The pubic defender's self-respect (credibility with herself) is also an
important concern. The public defender does not choose her cases, and
part of the ethic of public defense is the idea that everyone deserves
constitutional due process and a good defense. Most public defenders
believe that their work is honorable, whether their clients are guilty or
not. They do not judge or turn down clients. But to have a positional
conflict forced upon them may be too much for this sense of honor and
self-respect, especially if they believe it undermines their credibility with
their audience and clients.
In Williams, the state supported the attorney's motion to withdraw,
and the court allowed it. This was proper, and courts should grant such
motions even were the state to oppose them.220 One reason to grant such
motions is that although the credibility problem is very real for a public
defender, the client(s) will have no way to challenge the positional
conflict's effect on their case. Unlike paying criminal clients or civil
clients, a public defense client cannot fire the attorney to prevent the
positional conflict from materializing, even if the client comes to know
of the problem in time to act. Nor will the client have any post-trial
remedy. A positional conflict will probably not rise to the level of

219.

See

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 3.1 (2004) (prohibiting frivolous

claims and defenses, but allowing criminal defense lawyers to require proof of every
element of a crime); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, cmt. 6-10 (2004)
(discussing the different possible approaches for criminal defense counsel, as
distinguished from other lawyers, when false evidence has been offered).
220. The court in Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., v. United States Sentencing
Commission also advised that public defenders who were uncomfortable with a positional

conflict be allowed to withdraw. 680 F. Supp. at 30.
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ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
despite the Delaware court's statement that the attorney's positional
conflict "may
compromise the effectiveness of his assistance as appellate
1
counsel.,

22

To show a violation of the Sixth Amendment through ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) deficient
performance, and (2) prejudice, that the outcome of the proceeding more
probably than not would have been different.222 It is notoriously difficult
to show ineffective assistance.223
Even if one could show that
proceeding with a purely legal positional conflict was deficient
performance-a difficult showing given the disagreement among
authorities as to whether such a conflict is an ethical violation-it will be
impossible to show prejudice in most cases. If the prejudice claim is
based on impaired credibility, courts will presume that judges are able to
look past any credibility issue presented.22 4 If the claim of prejudice is
based on the creation of adverse precedent, it will also be impossible to
show that the court would have reached a different result had different
counsel been representing each case.
One might argue that a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel based on a positional conflict should not have to show prejudice.
Where a claim of ineffective assistance is based on a conflict of interest
adversely affecting performance, prejudice need not be shown.225 But
with such claims the defendant must nevertheless show the adverse effect
on performance. Again, it will be difficult to show exactly how the
conflict adversely affected the arguments made.226
Because a later challenge to the conviction based on a positional
conflict is unlikely to succeed, but the credibility impairment may be
221. 805 A.2d at 882.
222. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
223. See also Jacqueline McMurtrie, Unconscionable Contracting for Indigent
Defense: Using Contract Theory to Invalidate Conflict of Interest Clauses in Fixed-Fee
Contracts, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM _ (2006); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled:
The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARVARD L. REV. 2062, 2063.
Jeffrey L. Kirchemeyer, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L.
REV.425 (1996).
224. See Arizona Ethics Opinion No. 87-15 (1987).
225. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002); United States v. Schwarz, 283
F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2002).
226. The defendant might show an adverse effect based on timing of arguments,
delays that put one case ahead of the other, etc. See Dzienkowski, supra note 13. But
where there are other explanations for the timing, it will be hard to show the effect of the
conflict. If the defendant could show an economic reason for the lawyer to prefer one
case over the other, and that the preference caused the timing decisions, the defendant
could perhaps show a conflict with the lawyer's self-interest. See Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76.
But absent such proof, the defendant will have a tough time demonstrating a conflict.
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real, courts should grant motions by appointed counsel to withdraw due
to positional conflicts. There is little danger of abuse: the moving
attorney would have to show the conflict to the court. Direct legal
positional conflicts, especially in the same court, are likely to be rare. In
addition, such conflicts need not be imputed. Because the chief concern
is with the lawyer's credibility, not with financial incentives or divided
loyalties, public defenders from the same agency should be allowed to
take contrary positions on legal questions.2 2 ' Thus, the impact of a
policy to grant such motions to withdraw should be minimal.
For the same reasons that counsel's motion to withdraw should be
granted, public defenders should tell their clients about a positional
conflict so that the client might also protest-an argument after the fact
will be too late. 228 Because the positional conflict is not a true conflict of
interest, the client therefore has no right under the ethics rules or the
constitution to demand a lawyer without a positional conflict. But if a
client objects strenuously, the lawyer could move to withdraw in the
interests of client relations, or a court might grant the client's motion for
substitution of counsel.
Yet while such motions should be granted, it would not be advisable
to make withdrawal mandatory where the attorney has a positional
conflict. Just as the rule against positional conflicts seems to have
caused civil lawyers and firms to suppress such conflicts in various ways,
a more rigid rule against positional conflicts even for public defenders
might cause an abundance of caution that could deprive clients of good
quality counsel. In many jurisdictions, the supply of good public
defenders is limited, and conflict counsel might not always be of good
quality. 229 The assumption behind the conflict of interest rules-that
another competent lawyer is always available-is simply not warranted,
227. "Indeed, when two individual public defenders are arguing contrary legal
positions in separate cases, the integrity and independence of the defender agency is
apparent." Aprile, supra note 175, at 57.
228.

Moreover, under MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2005), lawyers have

an obligation to "reasonably consult" with clients about how to achieve client goals.
Such reasonable consultation should include discussing a positional conflict about a
significant issue, especially where credibility might be detrimentally affected.
229. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENSE, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE-A REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38

(2004); ACLU OF WA REPORT ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 10. The report provides

another reason not to require public defenders to withdraw for positional conflicts.
However ill-advised, it is not uncommon for public defense contracts to penalize the
recognition of a conflict of interest so that the contractor must pay for any conflict
counsel out of the contract fee. Just as with private civil attorneys, with such contracts a
rule against positional conflicts can create a financial reason to suppress the conflicting
legal argument. See McMurtrie, supra note 227.
234. See criticisms of Fiandaca,supra note 102.
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especially for poor clients.234
V.

Proposal to Amend Model Rule 1.7 Comment 22

The current comment on positional conflicts, comment 22 to Model
Rule 1.7, should be amended to say:
Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions on behalf of
different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on
behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of
a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not
create a conflict of interest.
Regardless of whether a lawyer
actually takes inconsistent legal positions in different cases, if the
legal arguments in unrelated cases are connected in such a way that a
lawyer is under pressure to shape, modify or drop arguments in one
case in light of the other case, the lawyer should assess whether there
is a significant risk that the representation of either or both case[s]
will be materially limited. Lawyers cannot always avoid such
pressure in their practice, but they should not undertake
representation that creates such pressure if they are unable to
withstand it.
If a lawyer determines to argue contrary legal positions in unrelated
cases, the lawyer should consider the credibility implications with
respect to the court(s) and the affected clients. Where the
inconsistent positions involve issues important to either case, and
especially where the positions are advocated in the same jurisdiction,
the prudent attorney will inform the affected clients. See Rule 1.4.
Where it is a single attorney, rather than different attorneys in a firm,
presenting contrary legal arguments, a court should grant an
appointed attorney's motion to withdraw for credibility concerns.
But the attorney should not be required to withdraw.
This proposal would change the current comment in several
important ways. First, it removes the suggestion that a legal positional
conflict by itself can be a conflict of interest in violation of the Model
Rules. Second, it would advise lawyers to consider the risk of material
impairment of representation from reconciling, modifying or dropping
arguments in one case to please or keep another client. The current
comment only advises lawyers to scrutinize positional conflicts-a faulty
indicator of conflict of interest. The proposal would also advise the
lawyer to consider the credibility implications of a positional conflict,
230. These first two sentences are from the current version of comment 24 to Model
Rule 1 7.
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and to inform the clients where the arguments are sufficiently important
and likely to affect credibility. The current comment does not address
credibility. Finally, the proposed comment advises that an appointed
lawyer's request to withdraw because of credibility concerns should be
respected, even though the lawyer cannot be required to withdraw as
there should be no ethical prohibition against positional conflicts.
VI. Conclusion
It is not easy to craft a rule for positional conflicts since the conflict
sits astride a fault-line of fundamental ambivalence in law practice and
theory about lawyer sincerity, loyalty and independence. The absence of
litigation about positional conflicts and the evidence of the much greater
force of business conflicts suggests that a stronger prohibition of
positional conflicts is not advisable. A positional conflict is actually a
faulty indicator of a conflict of interest-the real harm is when a lawyer
succumbs to pressure to drop or change arguments in one case in order
not to harm another client or case. But while a rule against positional
conflicts is therefore counterproductive, counsel's decision to withdraw
in the face of a positional conflict should be respected.
Positional conflicts can raise credibility concerns for individual
lawyers and firms, despite the widely held professional ideal of
independence, an ideal that is consistent with lawyers arguing both sides
of a legal issue in unrelated cases. Because of the importance of the
advocate's character or ethos to argument, a lawyer arguing both sides of
a legal issue may present a diminished sense of commitment to the
case-affecting credibility with the court, the clients and possibly the
public. The example of the public defender, whose clients are powerless
and who may not withdraw without court permission, illustrates these
credibility problems. While these credibility concerns do not rise to the
level of ethical violations, the prudent lawyer will carefully consider
them in determining whether to proceed with a positional conflict.

